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By the end of the 1994 elections, almost half- of the states had
amended their constitutions or passed legislation limiting the terms of
office of their United States Representatives and Senators.' The effort
to impose federal term limits appeared to be unstoppable. In May
1995, however, the movement hit a substantial roadblock when the
Supreme Court declared federal term limits unconstitutional in U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.2 Although the Court's opinion in U.S.
Term Limits did not extinguish all hope for term limits supporters, they
must now pursue change through the Article V process by convincing
members of Congress to propose a constitutional amendment or by
persuading state legislatures to petition for a constitutional
convention.3 Such a change in the direction of the term limits
I Of the 22 states with federal term limits measures at that time, eight had adopted
.pure" term limits of varying lengths. See COLO. CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 9a; MICH. CONsr. art.
II, § 10; MO. CONST. art. III, § 45a; Nev. Ballot Question 8, Nov. 8, 1994 (first vote of two
required by law to enact the initiative); OHIO CONST. art. V, § 8; OR. CONST. art. II, § 20
(phrased as a ballot access provision in one section); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 32; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 20A-10-301 (1995). Fourteen states designed their term limitations as "ballot
access" measures, allowing long-term incumbents to run but only as write-in candidates.
SeeALAsKA STAT. § 15.30.180 (Supp. 1995); ARiz. CONST. art. VII, § 18; Aiu. CONST. amend.
73, § 3; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8700 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b) (5)-(6);
IDAHO CODE § 34-907 (1995); ME. RE,. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 421 (West Supp. 1995); MASs.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, § 48 (West Supp. 1995); MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 8; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 16.1-01-13.1 (Supp. 1993); NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 20; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 12A;
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29.68.015-.016 (Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT. § 22-5-104 (Supp. 1994).
Although the provisions in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming were phrased as ballot
access measures, they would have operated as pure term limitations because they would
not have allowed write-in candidates. See AR. CONSr. amend. 73, § 3; OKLA. CONST. Art II,
§ 12A, Wyo. STAT. § 22-5-104 (Supp. 1994). In 1995, New Hampshire passed a ballot access
measure. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 653:3-4 (1996).
2 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995). In U.S. Term Limits, the Court held that the states could not
impose qualifications on federal officeholders in addition to those set forth in the
Qualifications Clauses of the United States Constitution. The Court relied, in part, on the
rationale used in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Powell denied Congress the
ability to impose additional qualifications under Article I, Section 5, which grants each
Chamber the power to judge the qualifications of its own members. In the Court's view,
the essential holding of Powell was that additional qualifications would violate the
"fundamental principle of our representative democracy . . . 'that the people should
choose whom they please to govern them'. " U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1850 (quoting
Powell, 395 U.S. at 547, quoting Alexander Hamilton in 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITLTION 257 (1836)).
The U.S. Term Limits Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that a state-
imposed term limitation phrased as a ballot access provision should be treated differently
than a "pure" term limitation. The Court broadly held that "a state amendment is
unconstitutional when it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and has
the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly." Id. at 1871. For analyses
of the opinions in U.S. Term Limits, see Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HnAv. L.
REV. 13, 14-15 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 H~av. L. RE. 78 (1995).
3 Initiatives to encourage a vote by the state legislatures on a constitutional
convention will appear on the 1996 ballot in as many as fifteen states. Term Limits Reviva4
WALL ST. J., July 22, 1996, at A14; Keith White, Term Limits Proponents to Push for a
Constitutional Convention, GANr NEws SERVICE, Dec. 10, 1995 (quoting one of the leaders
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movement should..mark- an-expansion of the perspective of legal
scholars who study term limitations. In anticipation of the Supreme
Court's ruling in U.S. Term Limits, legal scholarship primarily analyzed
and debated the constitutionality of state-imposed term limitations.4
Political scientists and economists have developed a rich and
sophisticated literature studying the effect of institutional
arrangements on the behavior of legislators, but they are still
developing an understanding of the changes that would accompany
the imposition of term limits.5
The claim at the core of the term limits movement remains
unresolved in the literature: the assertion that term limits will create a
Congress of ordinary citizens-"citizen-legislators"-who will serve
only a short time before returning to private life.6 Activists argue that
of U.S. Term Limits, a national association of term limits advocates, as saying that the
movement will now focus on raising $1.5 million to call for a constitutional convention by
1998).
,4 See, e.g., Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense
of the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HormsTr L. REv. 341 (1991);
Roderick M. Hills,Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53
U. PIT. L. REv. 97 (1991); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Are Congressional Term Limits
Constitutional?, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1994); James C. Otteson, A Constitutional
Analysis of Congressional Term Limits: Improving Representative Legislation Under the
Constitution, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1991); Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the
Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 321 (1993). With two
exceptions, see Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEo. L.J. 477 (1992) and
Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996)
(manuscript on file with the Cornell Law Review), legal scholarship does not address the
institutional consequences of term limits.
5 See, e.g., LIMITING LEGIsLATIvE TERMS (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds.,
1992) [hereinafter LIMING LEGISLATE TERMS]; Andrew R. Dick & John R. Lot, Jr.,
Reconciling Voters' Behavior with Legislative Term Limits, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1993); John B.
Gilmour & Paul Rothstein, Term Limitation in a Dynamic Model of Partisan Balance, 38 AM.J.
PoL Sci. 770 (1994); W. Robert Reed & D. Eric Schansberg, An Analysis of the Impact of
Congressional Term Limits, 32 EcoN. INQUIRY 79 (1994) [hereinafter Impact of Congressional
Term Limits]; W. Robert Reed & D. Eric Schansberg, The House Under Term Limits: What
Would It Look Like?, 76 Soc. Sci. Q. 699 (1995) [hereinafter The House]. The enactment of
term limits for state legislators is too recent to allow for substantial empirical work on their
effects. See Jay P. Greene, Term Limits: A Measure of Our Ignorance, 76 Soc. Scl. Q. 717, 717
(1995) ("To be sure, there is no shortage of hypotheses about what term limits would
produce, but we have little evidence with which to test these hypotheses since we have little
historical experience with legally imposed term limits."). Few transilational comparative
studies exist because only Costa Rica, Mexico, Ecuador, and the Philippines impose term
limits on federal legislators. JOHN M. CAREY, TERM LIMITS AND LEGISLATrvE REPRESENTATION
16-18 (1996) (using Costa Rica's experience with legislative term limits to draw some
conclusions about the possible effects of such provisions in the U.S.).
6 Thomas Mann, who does not support federal term limitations, defines these
political amateurs as "selfless citizens who temporarily answer their country's call to
legislate in the public interest." Term Limits for Members of the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives:. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Committee on theJudiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 16 (1994) [hereinafter House Hearings
on Term Limits] (testimony of Thomas E. Mann, The Brookings Institution). See also Cleta
D. Mitchell, Term Limits? Yes!, EXTENSIONS, Spring 1991, at 3 (defining the amateur as "the
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Congress will no longer be the domain of professionals whose long
careers center on attaining and retaining powerful and prestigious
political offices. Regardless of other substantive changes in the
legislative process that term limits supporters view as beneficial, all
activists seem to believe that empowering the citizen-legislator is
prerequisite to improving federal governance. 7 Relying on insights
from economists and political scientists, however, I conclude that the
adoption of term limitations will not usher in a new era of
Cincinnatus. Instead, a majority of federal legislators will continue to
be professionals, both because many people will still find a career in
politics attractive, and because the only way officeholders can
continue to receive a return on their investments in political capital is
to remain employed in politics. Primarily because of the latter
phenomenon, many who intended to remain in the political arena
only a short time when they entered the legislature will find a longer
political career attractive when they face a return to private life.
This conclusion does not mean that other goals of term limits
supporters cannot be realized. If term limits significantly affect the
nature of a legislator's job by changing the benefits associated with
membership in Congress, then politicians-whether amateurs or
professionals-may behave differently.8  Shortened tenure may
fundamentally alter the dynamics of the legislative process so that
serving in Congress will no longer allow a politician to satisfy in the
way she does now such objectives as wielding power and influence,
shaping national policies, and receiving benefits from interest groups.
In this Article, I discuss some of the likely changes, including how
shorter terms may affect the seniority system, the ability of members to
pursue their policy goals successfully, and the relationship between
interest groups and federal legislators. I conclude that the hope for a
transformation of the status quo, solely because of the
implementation of federal term limits, is likely to be dashed.
man from the log cabin, the 'anyone can be president' belief system that is the centerpiece
of our democracy").
7 See, e.g., GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS, AND THE RECOVERY
OF DEUBERATIvE DEMOCRACY 9, 145 (1992); Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 4, at 383; Forbes,
Friedman Address Reform-Minded Crowd, No UNCERTAIN TERMS, Dec. 1995, at 4 (According to
Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman, "[t]he short term limit would attract a
different sort of candidate ... people who would like to spend a few years promoting the
public interest, the citizen representative."); Ronald Brownstein, Converting Congress Back
Into a Real Citizen Legislature LA TIMEs, Sept. 12, 1994, at A5. See also infra text at notes 17-
18.
8 Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin, Term Limits for Lawmakers: How to Start
Thinking About a Proposal in Process, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS, supra note 5, at 3
("Limiting lawmakers' terms of office would affect some of the most basic incentives that
shape the way legislatures work in the United States."); WILL, supra note 7, at 145 (noting
that "term limitation is a simple, spare reform to alter the incentives that are relevant to
entry into, and behavior while in, public life").
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Institutional structures are not purely exogenous; if politicians wish to
continue to receive the benefits that they now enjoy, they can
compensate for the imposition of term limits by adopting rules and
making other changes that will allow them to do so.
A change as significant as the imposition of federal term limits
presents numerous issues and challenges for scholars, which I cannot
hope to discuss fully in this Article. For example, the term limits
movement presents a case study of our increasing tendency to eschew
direct solutions in favor of structural changes designed to result
indirectly in desired reforms.9 The preference for a procedural
solution-term limits-over the direct option of "voting the rascals
out" to implement new policies may partially result from a prisoners'
dilemma in which voters find themselves.' 0 Voters may prefer a
legislature of new politicians, but voters only elect a single
representative. Voters also know that they receive a greater share of
government benefits if they are represented by a relatively more
senior representative. If voters could coordinate their efforts by
voting out all incumbents simultaneously so that no constituency were
represented by a lawmaker with greater pork-barreling skills, all voters
would maximize their utility. Without coordination, however, each
individual voter has an incentive to defect and reelect her own
representative, hoping that other voters elect newcomers. As a result,
the common goal-a legislature without long-term incumbents-is
never attained. Term limits may solve the dilemma; the reform forces
voters to elect new representatives frequently and denies them the
opportunity to follow the otherwise dominant strategy of reelecting
long-time incumbents.
In this Article, however, my focus is on the claim that term limits
activists identify as the prerequisite to further beneficial changes in
9 Other procedural solutions that are currently in vogue include: (1) a
constitutional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget and budget process
legislation as a means to control federal spending, see DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFrcrrs
MATTER? (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 390-436, on file with author); (2) regulatory
reform proposals that implement processes designed to ensure congressional
consideration of property rights issues but do not mandate any particular outcome, see S.
843, 104th Cong., lst Sess. (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 275-76 (1996); and (3) the recently-enacted
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act that relies on a structure similar to the budget process to
require that Congress generate information about the expected cost of federal mandates
and to ensure congressional deliberation, see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political
Safeguards of Federalism?: The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, at 25-27 (Sept. 9,
1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Cornell Law Review).
10 For a discussion of the prisoners' dilemma in the context of term limits, see Dick &
Lott, supra note 5, at 4, 8-9; Elhauge, supra note 4, at 21-24. See also Putting an End to the
Prisoners'Dilemma of Incumbency, No UNCERTAIN TERs, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 7. See genera!/y
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33-34 (1994) (describing prisoners'
dilemmas).
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Congress: the need to fill Congress with political amateurs. First, I
briefly describe the current status of the term limits movement in the
wake of U.S. Term Limits.' I then argue that supporters' claim that
citizen-legislators would dominate the federal political scene after the
ratification of a term limits amendment is overstated. To support this
analysis of term limits, I use empirical research on political ambition
that has not, in most cases, been applied in this context. Finally, using
a dynamic approach, I suggest that institutional changes in Congress
will largely negate any effect of term limits on the incentives that
influence a professional politician's decision to run for office. The
only change for which it will be difficult to compensate entirely is a
reduction in legislator effectiveness; I identify some of the possible
consequences of such reduced expertise. My conclusions in this final
section are speculative because very little empirical and theoretical
research has been done on the effects of term limits on political
careers and legislator effectiveness.
I
THE DIRECTION OF THE NATIONAL TERM LIMITS MOVEMENT
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
US. TERM .LJMI7, INC. V. THORNTON
Until recently, term limits supporters directed most of their en-
ergy toward imposing term limitations on federal legislators through
amendments to state constitutions. This strategic decision was no
doubt supported by the sensible belief that federal legislators would
be unwilling to enact term limitations which could shorten their own
political careers. 12 Although many ambitious state politicians might
11 For the purposes of this article, I assume that a term limits amendment would
provide for the following- a twelve-year limit on service in the Senate; a twelve-year limit on
service in the House; a candidate's service in one chamber would not count toward the
term limitation in the other chamber; and any service in Congress prior to the effective
date of the amendment would not be included in the term limits calculation. The
amendment supported by a majority of the House of Representatives contained the
provisions detailed above. Amend. No. 4 in H.R. REP. No. 104-82, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in CONG. REc. H3959 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1993). Other proposals, which were
defeated, would have limited representatives to six years, Amend. No. 2, id. at H3941;
allowed states to set limitations of fewer terms in office, Amend. No. 3, id. at H3949; or
counted the terms of office served before enactment of the constitutional amendment,
Amend. No. 1, id. at H3928. Although some of the state term limitations proposals limited
members of the House to fewer than twelve years, the majority of the state provisions reset
the term limits clock and allowed people to run again after a certain "cooling off" period,
during which the candidate could not serve in the relevant body. Because of these cooling
off periods, most of the state-imposed term limitations, although allowing fewer terms for
representatives, were actually more generous than the federal proposal. Rotation would
have been even easier in a state that adopted a limitation only on "consecutive" terms in
one body.
12 Incumbent politicians might be hesitant to support term limits language even if it
did not apply to them (through a grandfathering provision) because such compromise
628 [Vol. 81:623
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have supported federal term limits as a way to hasten their political
advancement, the ability to amend most state constitutions through
popular vote allowed supporters to bypass any state lawmakers who
might have been reluctant in their support because of hopes of long
careers at the federal level.
The decision in U.S. Term Limits has dramatically changed the tac-
tics of term limits supporters. Their new objective is to convince the
states to call for a constitutional convention to propose a federal term
limits amendment. The procedural hurdles involved in proposing an
amendment, not to mention the additional requirements for ratifica-
tion, suggest that supporters face a long and arduous road. Their pri-
mary hope for success lies in the strength with which the term limits
issue resonates with voters. A poll conducted approximately one
month after the Court decided U.S. Term Limits indicated that voters
strongly favor federal term limits. This support is consistent across a
variety of demographic groups, including members of both parties,
men and women, voters of all ages, and voters in all regions. 13
If term limits remain a salient issue for voters, federal legisla-
tors-notwithstanding their own self-interest-may heed voters' de-
mands for a constitutional amendment. After all, it is an easy issue for
voters to understand and remember at the voting booth.14 As long as
language could be portrayed as staggeringly hypocritical during their next campaigns. The
strong opposition to term limits by most Democratic officials and party leaders, who, until
1994, appeared likely to control the House of Representatives for the foreseeable future,
provided another incentive for activists to concentrate their energies on the states. See
Thomas Galvin, Term Limits: Big Chunk of 103rd Congress May Have Limited Tenure, 50 CONG.
Q. 3493 (Oct. 31, 1992) (noting opposition of leading Democrats to term limits); see also
Term Limit Divide, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1995, at A8 (same). In contrast, a federal term
limits proposal was a prominent part of the Republican "Contract With America." Republi-
cans' Initial Promise: 100-Day Debate on 'Contract,'CONG. Q.: GUIDE TO CURRENT AM. GOV'T,
Spring. 1995, at 54. The 1992 Republican platform also contained a term limits plank.
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 22, 1992, at 2572.
'3 Benjamin Sheffner, ROLL CALL, July 27, 1995, at 5 (discussing results of poll by
Tarrance Group). See GORDON S. BLACK & BENJAMIN D. BLACK, THE PoLrrics OF AMERICAN
DiscoNTErE: How A NEw PARTY CAN MAKE DEMOCRACY WORK AGAIN 210-13 (1994) (dis-
cussing the support among various demographic groups for state term limits initiatives).
Perhaps the most interesting findings of the Tarrance Group poll are the intensity of the
support, with forty-two percent calling the issue extremely or very important to their vote,
and the significance of the issue for conservative Democrats, who are often identified as
key voters in national elections. Sheffher, supra, at 5 (citing Tarrance Group poll). An-
other vital group-the independent voters who support Ross Perot's agenda-consider
term limits to be a pivotal issue. Leslie Phillips, With Powell Out, Perot Could Be Factor, USA
TODAY, Nov. 9, 1995, at 3A (noting that Perot's new Reform Party intends to promote term
limits as a central issue).
14 For a discussion of information costs facing the voter, see ANTHONY DowNs, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207-19 (1957); Moams P. FIoRINA, RETROSPEcrvE VOT-
ING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECrIONS 198-200 (1981). Perhaps the relative ease of moni-
toring explains the surprising amount of congressional support for a constitutional
amendment. In March 1995, the amendment received the support of a majority of the
House, but it failed because it did not attract the required two-thirds vote. 141 CONG. REC.,
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the matter is brought to the floor and a vote is taken, voters can deter-
mine whether a member of Congress supported or opposed term lim-
its simply by knowing how she voted. In addition, political opponents
have strong incentives to bring this information to voters' attention.
Federal term limits will become a particularly prominent issue in
states with limits on state officeholders. 15 Challengers who can no
longer serve as state legislators or governors will certainly realize that
the term limitations issue motivates voters.
II
THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZEN-LEGISLATOR
Term limits activists hope to rid Congress of the professional poli-
tician because they believe that such a lawmaker inevitably acts in ways
that are contrary to the public interest. They would replace the pro-
fessionals with amateurs who have little experience in politics but a
great deal of experience as ordinary citizens. 16 Much of the term lim-
H3965 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1995). In April 1996, the Senate narrowly defeated a cloture
motion that would have brought the constitutional amendment to a vote; 58 senators voted
in favor of cloture. See 142 CONG. REG., S3878 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1996).
15 Twenty-three states place term limitations on state legislators. In addition, forty
states limit the number of terms that their governors can serve. The Spread of Term Limits,
DES MOINES REG., May 23, 1995, at 1.
16 America's belief in the utility and efficacy of rotation in office reflects a
political culture long hostile to the concentration of political power, perma-
nence in government, professional politicians, and bureaucratic power.
The principle of rotation embraces the proposition that democracy is prop-
erly government by amateurs and that the voices of amateurs in the halls of
Congress and in many state legislatures throughout the nation are silenced
by a chorus of career legislators and other professional politicians.
Mark P. Petracca, Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea, in LIMITING LEGISLATrVE TERMs,
supra note 5, at 19, 42. During the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates,
the issue of term limits was referred to as the question of "rotation", i.e., whether public
officials should be required to leave government after a number of years and remain in
private life for some time before re-entering politics. See id. at 30-31; see also VICTOR
KAMBER, GIVING UP ON DEMOCRACy. WHY TERM LIMITS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 21 (1995)
(stating that the idea of the citizen-legislator is "a fetish" among term limiters). But see
Elhauge, supra note 4 at 51-74, (arguing in favor of term limits for reasons unrelated to the
citizen-legislator ideal).
The outcry against political professionalism is of somewhat recent origin. In the early
part of the century, the progressive agenda for the reform of Congress included a demand
to increase the level of professionalism by encouraging people to view public service as a
career. See H. Douglas Price, Congress and the Evolution of Legislative "Profssionalism," in
CONGRESS IN CHANGE: EVOLrTIoN AND REFORM 2 (Norman J. Ornstein ed., 1975) [herein-
after CONGRESS IN CHANGE]; Robert Struble, Jr., House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation,
94 POL. ScI. Q. 649 (Winter 1979-80). Indeed, beginning in the 1960s, the campaign to
increase professionalism in the federal legislature moved to the state level, where it was
seen as a crucial step in modernizing and improving state legislatures. See David H. Ever-
son, The Impact of Term Limitations on the States: Cutting the Underbrush or Chopping Down the
Tall Timber, in LIMITING LEGIsATvE TERMs, supra note 5, at 194-95; see also Gary F. Mon-
crief et al., For Whom the Bell Tolls: Term Limits and State Legislatures, 17 IEGIS. STUD. Q. 37
(1992) (finding that term limitations on state legislators will have the greatest impact on
"professional" legislatures and virtually no impact in states that still have "amateur" legisla-
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its literature reads as a paean to amateurism. The solution to the
problem of careerists, activists argue, is to eliminate the incentives that
encourage people to make politics their profession and instead to fill
Congress with citizen-legislators. 17 Average Americans will leave their
jobs in the private sector for a very short period of time, serve their
country, and then return to their ordinary lives. Although some par-
ticularly outstanding Americans may continue to serve their country
in a variety of political jobs after their limited service in Congress, the
vision of government by amateurs allows for such a professional, but
mobile, politician only in truly extraordinary cases.' 8
In addition to the disappearance of professional politicians, sup-
porters believe that a new dominance of amateur legislators would
have other institutional effects.' 9 Many activists focus on the relation-
ship between term limits and governance structures, but they do not
all share the same vision of an ideal democracy. Some argue that in-
volving more Americans in the process of governing would enhance
participatory democracy. A citizen-legislature, marked by frequent
turnover and filled with amateurs, would be more consistent with the
ideal of such a democracy because the privilege of serving in elected
office would be more widely dispersed throughout society.20 Others
argue that eliminating careerism from politics would bring our de-
tures); Cynthia Opheim, The Effect of U.S. State Legislative Term Limits Revisited, 19 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 49 (1994) (same).
17 See, e.g., WiLi, supra note 7, at 212; Mark P. Petracca, The Poison of Professional Poli-
tics, in POLicY ANALYsis 3 (Cato Institute Series No. 151, 1991); see also Cleta D. Mitchell,
Limiting Congressional Terms: A Return to Fundamental Democracy, 7 J.L. & Po- 733, 739
(1991) (noting that the objective of term limits advocates is not merely to increase the
turnover in Congress, but to replace the "career orientation" of officeholders). A similar
fascination with the citizen-legislator led Lamar Alexander, a candidate for the 1996 Re-
publican presidential nomination, to propose a shorter legislative year and a repeal of the
ban on outside income so members would spend time in their home states living as ordi-
nary citizens. See Ronald Brownstein, Converting Congress Back Into a Real Citizen Legislature,
LA TiMEs, Sept. 12, 1994, at A5 (describing Alexander's proposal and criticisms of it).
18 Mitchell, supra note 17, at 741 (noting that "legislative giants" could continue ser-
vice in higher office); see also WiLL, supra note 7, at 84 (noting, apparently without disap-
proval, that when rotation was the norm, national legislators often returned to state
political offices).
19 Similarly, to the extent that it was not a matter of partisan politics, the adoption of
Amendment XXII was motivated by a desire to implement a procedural reform to reduce
the power of the executive branch relative to the legislative. Stephen W. Stathis, The
Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or Partisan Maneuver?, 7 CoNsT. COMMENTARY
61, 68-72 (1990).
20 Witt, supra note 7, at 154, 164; see also Gary W. Copeland, Legislative Term Limits as
Legislative Reform, Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association (Sept. 1-4, 1994) (manuscript at 27, on file with the Cornell Law Review) (in-
creased turnover seen as increasing the openness of the system); Natalie Chambers, Term
Limits Sponsor Sees More Seeking Office, Miss. PRESS, OCt. 5, 1995, at 1A (quoting a sponsor of
the state term limits movement as stating, "I think you're going to see a lot more people
running for office and trying to get involved in the process, than you've ever seen before").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
mocracy closer to a direct democracy;2 1 still others see term limits as a
way to fulfill the Madisonian vision of a representative democracy.22
On a less fundamental level, activists also hope that term limits
will spark certain changes in the legislative process. Interestingly,
although some outspoken supporters are also advocates of a smaller
federal government,23 they seldom describe (in term limits literature,
at least) the content of the bills that citizen-legislators would pass. In-
stead, they state in general terms that reducing the "corruption" in-
herent in the current environment would lead to lawmakers' enacting
"better" legislation. Underlining this concern with corruption, the
term limits literature also contains arguments in favor of additional
congressional reforms to reduce or eliminate pecuniary and other
benefits that members receive.2 4
Perhaps these themes reveal that the dislike of professional politi-
cians can be reduced to the sentiment that political careerists are
somehow not like "us"-average citizens. And perhaps, some activists
appear to argue, they were never like "us." The desire to enter politics
and to submit oneself to the rigors of campaigning and the intense
scrutiny of the media is a rather unattractive trait-a trait thankfully
not shared by many of "us." Even if one of "us" braves the gauntlet
and gets elected, then the life of a politician renders her incapable of
identifying with the ordinary person's hopes, dreams, and frustra-
21 Many term limits supporters seem to equate the public interest with what a majority
of voters want. See, e.g., House Hearings on Term Limits, supra note 6, at 69 (testimony of
Mark P. Petracca); John H. Fund, Term Limitations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, in LIMrr-
INc LEGIsLATvwE TERMs, supra note 5, at 225; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 736-37.
22 Some advocates favor term limits as a way to insulate elected officials from their
constituents so that the officials can deliberate in an effort to make the best decisions in
the interests of the country. George Will argues that the framers of our representative
democracy structured the federal government "to increase the probability that public senti-
ments will be leavened by thoughtfulness as they pass along the way to becoming law."
WILL, supra note 7, at 121 (1992); see also F.A. HAr.Y, 3 LAw, LEGIsLATION AND LIBERTY 113
(1979) (same); THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The republican principle ... does not require an unqualified complaisance to
every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive
from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests."); Marci A.
Hamilton, Power, Responsibility, and Republican Democracy, 93 MICH. L. Rv. 1539, 1553-58
(1995) (discussing tension between the original vision of a republican form of government
and various proposals to increase elements of direct democracy).
23 For example, one of the primary supporters is Grover Norquist who, as head of the
National Taxpayers Union, argues for tax restructuring, a balanced federal budget, and a
vastly reduced federal government. Art Pine, Vaunted Taxpayer Revolt Only a Skirmish So Far,
WAsH. PosT,June 3, 1979, atA8;Jeff Shear, Meet the Antitax Man, NAT'LJ.,June 25, 1994, at
1517.
24 See, e.g., Term Limits Plus: A Broad Agenda for Comprehensive Congressional Reform, No
UNCERTAIN TERMS, Dec. 1995, at 4 (advocating, in addition to term limits, a Citizen Con-
gress Act to eliminate pensions and cost-of-living adjustments; to dock pay for absences; to
require that frequent flyer miles be used only for official trips; and to eliminate special
parking at National Airport). For a more detailed discussion of concerns about interest
group influence, see infra part LV.C.
[Vol. 81:623
TERM LIMITATIONS
tions.2 5 Politicians are routinely given-'special treatment they are
wooed by special interests; they exempt themselves from legislation
that burdens private citizens; and they have a personal stake in ex-
panding, the size and scope of government so that they can exercise
more power. Term limits are seen as one step in ensuring that politi-
cians are truly average Americans, and they should be enacted with
other reforms to make the job of a federal legislator more like any
other job.
Whatever the ultimate goals of the leaders of the movement, the
resounding theme that unifies them is that professional politicians are
the root of most problems pervading the federal government and that
the citizen-legislator is the solution. Many average Americans who are
sympathetic to this rhetoric are alienated and cynical with an intense,
but generalized, distrust of the federal government and those who
make a living working in it.26 If, after this sizable group accomplished
the difficult task of ratifying a constitutional amendment, the citizen-
legislator remained merely a mythic creature, their alienation and
their skepticism regarding the legitimacy of the political process
would increase. In addition, if term limits caused unanticipated and
undesirable effects that were not balanced by positive consequences,
the country would face the necessity of enacting another constitu-
tional amendment to repeal them. With these disturbing possibilities
in mind, I turn to the question of whether term limits will mark the
end of the era of the professional politician.
III
THE PREVALENCE OF PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS IN
CONGRESS AFTER RATIFICATION OF A TERM
LIMITS AMENDMENT
The first step is to analyze and resolve term limit activists' central
claim-will term limits operate to replace professional politicians,
who regard service in elected office as a career, with citizen-legislators,
who will spend only a short time in public service? To answer this
question, we must identify the different kinds of ambition that moti-
vate people to run for elected office. Political opportunities shape
ambitions and, in turn, ambition molds elected office. If the nature
and structure of political opportunities change substantially, so may
25 Cf United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1310 (1995) (observing that an
aide who picked up Rep. Rostenkowski's laundry and drove his family around Washington
"might, in some circumstances directly-even vitally-aid a Congressman in the perform-
ance of his official duties," and therefore the staff member might be performing "official"
duties).
26 See Priscilla L. Southwell, "Throwing the Rascals Out" versus "Throwing in the Towel"
Alienation, Support for Term Limits, and Congressional Voting Behavior, 76 Soc. Scx. Q. 741, 741-
42 (1995).
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the nature of political ambition. The issue is whether such a change
will create a citizen-legislature. The "ambition theory of politics," for-
mulated three decades ago, by Joseph A. Schlesinger,27 provides a
framework for this analysis.
A. Political Ambition and Political Careers
Three types of ambition have been identified through observa-
tions of congressional and other political behavior. Most discussions
of political ambition are not attempts to identify the underlying be-
liefs and objectives that cause a particular behavior. Instead, the am-
bition theory of politics provides a classification scheme to facilitate
the analysis of observable behavior.28 The first kind of ambition is
discrete ambition. This ambition is contained; a politician who exhibits
discrete ambition seeks election to one office for a very limited time
and returns to private life rather than pursuing reelection.2 9 It is the
only type of ambition that does not provide the basis for a career in
politics, and it is the type that term limit supporters hope will charac-
terize legislators in the future. Examples of politicians who display
discrete ambition include a President in his second term of office, or a
spouse who is appointed to serve the remainder of her deceased part-
ner' s term in Congress.3 0
The two other kinds of ambition are viewed by advocates of term
limits as undesirable.3 ' Static ambition is observed when a politician
27 See JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER, AMBITION AND POLITICS: POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1966).
28 Id. at 14.
29 Id. at 10.
30 A recent example of this phenomenon was the appointment ofJocelyn Birch Bur-
dick to serve the remaining months of North Dakota Senator Quentin Burdick's term,
after his death in 1992. Not all members of Congress appointed to finish their deceased
spouses' termi demonstrate discrete ambition, however. Hattie Carraway of Arkansas, the
first woman to be appointed to complete her husband's term in the Senate, later won the
seat in her own right. Perhaps the most famous example of a spouse who first demon-
strated static ambition and then progressive ambition was Rep. Margaret Chase Smith, who
served in the House for eight years after being appointed to her deceased husband's vacant
seat and then for another 24 years in the Senate. See HOPE CHAMBERLAIN, A MINORITY OF
MEMBERS: WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1973); OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WOMEN IN CONGRESS, 1917-1990 (1991). For a
discussion of the likelihood that politicians with discrete ambition will develop progressive
ambition after a period of congressional service, see infra notes 102-04 and accompanying
text.
31 Unlike term limits advocates, Professor Schlesinger sees static and progressive am-
bition as potentially beneficial. Schlesinger states:
To slight the role of ambition in politics, then, or to treat it as a human
failing to be suppressed, is to miss the central function of ambition in polit-
ical systems. A political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as
much in danger of breaking down as one unable to restrain ambitions.
Representative government, above all, depends on a supply of men so
.driven; the desire for election and, more important, for reelection becomes
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remains in one office for a substantial period of time, running again
and again for reelection. This type of ambition is currently the most
prevalent in the federal legislature-long-time incumbents remain in
one body for decades and accumulate power in a system organized by
seniority. The final kind of ambition is progressive ambition, which a
politician displays when she moves from one office to the next, seek-
ing to serve in increasingly prestigious and powerful positions during
a long political career.
These different conceptions of ambition help to contrast profes-
sional politicians with amateurs, although defining the boundaries
among the three types can be difficult. For example, if statically-ambi-
tious politicians are content to run for reelection only a few times,
then they might be sufficiently discretely ambitious to satisfy term lim-
its supporters. But federal legislators are often motivated by ambi-
tions for political careers of lengths that disqualify them as citizen-
legislators. The best measure of whether term limits will affect mem-
bers before they are willing to leave office voluntarily is the mean com-
pleted tenure of retired members of Congress and the estimated
mean completed tenure of current members of Congress.32 The esti-
mated terms for current members are calculated by using a "continua-
tion rate," which measures the likelihood that a member will continue
in office for an additional term.33 The mean completed tenure
figures indicate that members of Congress serve, on average, more
than six tenns in the House and two terms in the Senate. If one uses a
continuation rate based on data from 1985-1991, the average length
of a completed spell in the House is 17.8 years for a new member,34
the electorate's restraint upon its public officials. No more irresponsible
government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for
their political futures.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 2; see alsoJohn Ferejohn, Incumbent Peiformance and Electoral
Contro 50 PUB. CHOICE 5, 8 (1986) (noting that the natural mechanism to induce politi-
cians to act in the interests of their constituents is the frequency of elections and the
lawmakers' desire to remain in office). But see infra note 202 (discussing whether threat of
defeat is only way to control legislator shirking).
32 The more frequently used mean tenure figure consistently underestimates the
number of expected completed terms of lawmakers because it includes members who have
not yet completed their legislative service without projecting how long they will remain in
Congress. See W. Robert Reed & D. Eric Schansberg, How Long Do Congressmen Stay in
Office?, 2 ECON. & POL. 173, 17-74 (1990). For a discussion of the advantage of the contin-
uation rate approach over an approach that relies on average tenure, see id. at 174, 179-85.
33 See W. Robert Reed & D. Eric Schansberg, The Behavior of Congressional Tenure Over
Time: 1953-1991, 73 PUB. CHOICE 183, 185 (1992) (describing the formula used to com-
pute the probability that representative will leave Congress with n terms of completed
tenure).
34 Reed & Schansberg, Impact of Congressional Term Limits, supra note 5, at 82. Using
the continuation rate for 1977-1991, which includes data from the entire period following
the significant institutional reforms in the House, the mean completed tenure is 13.5 years
in the House. Id.
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and the average length of a completed spell in the Senate is slightly
longer.3 5
Clearly, legislators who currently exhibit static ambition are not
exhibiting what term limits supporters would consider discrete ambi-
tion; most politicians would find the careers they desired cut short.
Had twelve-year term limits been in place at the end of the 102nd
Congress, thirty-seven percent of the House and half of the Senate
would have been ineligible to seek reelection.3 6 Members of Congress
in high-profile leadership roles will disproportionately feel the effect
of term limits. Had term limits been in effect during the 1992 elec-
tions, not a single committee chairman in either chamber would have
been eligible to run for reelection. 37 Over the past ten years, the aver-
age tenure for chairmen and ranking members of House committees
has been approximately twenty-three years. In the Senate, chairmen
and ranking members have an average tenure of nearly twenty years.38
And, if one isolates only the most powerful committees in each
body,3 9 the average tenure increases to over twenty-five years in the
House and over twenty-three years in the Senate.
Compared to the separation between discrete and static ambi-
tion, the boundary between static and progressive ambition is even
more indistinct-possibly non-existent. Both kinds of political ca-
reers-long-time service in one body and movement up the political
opportunity structure-appear to be motivated by the same kind of
ambition, the kind conventionally labelled as progressive. Perhaps we
should more accurately consider most politicians as motivated by "ca-
reerist ambition" which is manifested through two different types of
behavior. If we do not observe progressively-ambitious behavior, then
the politician has likely never had a realistic opportunity to move to a
more prestigious and powerful political office and has, as a result, con-
tented herself with a career shaped by static ambition. Term limits
eliminate the ability of legislators to pursue static ambitions indefi-
nitely, however. If the underlying motivation for careerists is the same
(regardless of how it is exhibited), statically-ambitious politicians will
35 Reed & Schansberg, supra note 33, at 196 figs. 4 & 5.
36 John R. Hibbing, Careerism in Congress: For Better or for Worse?, in CONGRESS RECON-
SIDERED 68 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993).
37 Id.
38 I calculated these figures using data drawn from MicIIAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFsA,
THE ALMANAC OF AMxiucAN PoLIrIcs (1988-1996). Tenure (years in Congress) was com-
puted by subtracting the year of first election from the year of exit (or the current year in
the case of those members still in Congress).
39 I considered the most powerful committees in the House to be Appropriations,
Armed Services, Budget, Economic and Educational Opportunity, Rules, and Ways and
Means. In the Senate, I considered the most powerful committees to be Appropriations,
Armed Services, Budget, Education and Labor, and Finance. Again, calculations were de-
rived using data from BARONE & UJpsA, supra note 38.
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naturally consider altering their behavior to fit the strategy of progres-
sive ambition, a course that remains open to them under term
limits. 4 0
Some political scientists have assumed that legislators possess only
progressive ambition (with rare instances of discrete ambition).41
David W. Rohde explained why he thought it fair to assume that all
members of the House, regardless of their observed behavior, were
progressively ambitious:
[W]e assume that if a member of the House, on his first day of ser-
vice, were offered a Senate seat or a governorship without cost or risk,
he would take it. Thus static ambition is not something chosen a
priori, but is a behavior pattern manifested by a member because of
the risks of the particular opportunity structure he finds himself in,
and his unwillingness to bear those risks. 42
A recent study by Professors Kiewiet and Zeng supports the assump-
tion of nearly universal progressive ambition. They found that when
presented with a realistic opportunity for success in obtaining a higher
office, most House incumbents displayed progressive ambition.43
Again, the opportunity structure defined the behavior of House mem-
bers; it shaped their progressive ambition into static ambition when
the former was unlikely to be satisfied.
The dominance of progressive ambition among political career-
ists explains why long-time incumbents, who are formally classified as
statically ambitious, often demonstrate a variation of progressive ambi-
tion. Rather than seeking to move to higher office (perhaps because
40 See Schlesinger, supra note 27, at 49 ("To the extent that political ambitions are
generalized, frustration in one direction leads to the transfer of energies to other more
accessible outlets."); cf Gordon S. Black, A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the
Role of Structural Incentives, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 144, 158 (1972) ("[T]he structure of a
political system acts as a filter that allows some types of individuals to move up through the
system, while others are either stopped in their progress or diverted in less risky and costly
directions." (emphasis added)); id. at 145 (stating that "the office-holder responds primarily
to the immediate forces in his political environment rather than to factors that occur in
the more distant past" and that politicians "tend to develop ambition slowly as a result of
their changing circumstances").
41 For example, Professor Schlesinger assumes that progressive ambition is the domi-
nant form of ambition motivating politicians. SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 13.
42 David W. Rohde, Risk-Beating and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the
United States House of Representatives, 23 Am.J. OF POL. ScI. 1, 3 (1979) (foomote omitted).
Professor Rohde noted, however, that a few examples of discrete ambition can be found in
the House. Id. at 3 n.3; see also Paul R. Abramson et al., Progressive Ambition Among United
States Senators: 1972-1988, 49J. OF POL. 3, 5 (1987) (extending Rohde's assumption to the
Senate). But see Kenneth Prewitt & William Nowlin, Political Ambitions and the Behavior of
Incumbent Politicians, 22 W. POL. Q. 298, 307 (1969) (finding both static and progressive
ambition among city councilmen in the San Francisco Bay area and hypothesizing that,
although more federal legislators are progressively ambitious, some are still motivated by
static ambition).
43 D. Roderick Kiewiet & Langche Zeng, An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions,
1947-1986, 87 AM. PoL Sc. REv. 928, 933 (1993).
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they perceive that the opportunity structure for progression is
blocked), these politicians spend a great deal of their time in the
House or Senate seeking more powerful roles within the body. Such
"intra-institutional ambition"4 is encouraged by the organization of
Congress, which relies heavily on a seniority system when choosing
party leaders and chairmen of committees and subcommittees.45 Leg-
islators who currently exceed the twelve-year limitation in either
house have typically spent their careers climbing the ladder of leader-
ship positions in the House or Senate, serving on increasingly power-
ful and prestigious committees, and holding increasingly influential
chairmanships or party offices. After the adoption of term limits, it
will be natural for them to channel their ambition from position-seek-
ing to office-seeking.
B. Term Limits and the Shape of Political Careers
Given the close relationship among the types of ambition that
shape political careers, the question of whether term limits will dis-
courage careerism depends primarily, if not entirely, on how term lim-
its affect progressive ambition. If term limits supporters are correct in
their hypothesis that limited terms will keep most people from pursu-
ing a career in politics-thus leaving the door open to political ama-
teurs-then term limits must operate to discourage entry by
candidates with progressive ambition. In addition, the adoption of
term limits must prevent people who enter politics with discrete ambi-
tion from developing progressive ambition. In my view, term limits
accomplish neither objective in most cases.
This inquiry is important for two reasons. First, it tests the accu-
racy of the claim that term limits will bring about a citizen-legislature.
Second, it calls into question an assumption made by some who study
term limits: that term limits will allow legislators to ignore the interests
of their constituents in their final terms in office. For example,
Professors Spitzer and Cohen use game theory to predict legislator
44 See Rebekah Herrick & Michael K. Moore, Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative
Behavior Schlesinger's Typology Reconsidered and Revised, 55 J. OF POL. 765, 765-69 (1993)
(studying intra-institutional ambition, that is, position-seeking rather than office-seeking).
Herrick and Moore conclude that position-seekers exhibit a different sort of ambition than
either office-seekers or politicians who merely seek reelection. Id. at 773. A better conclu-
sion, however, may be that position-seeking represents a way for ambitious persons to ac-
commodate their ambition within the current political opportunity structure. Cf Richard
L. Hall & Robert P. van Houweling, Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Deci-
sions to Run or Retire from the US. House, 89 AM. PoL Sci. REV. 121 (1995) (considering the
likelihood of satisfying intra-institutional ambition in modeling the decisions of representa-
tives to run for reelection or to retire from the House).
45 See infra text accompanying notes 111-19. For a further discussion of the seniority
system in Congress, see infra part IVA.
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behavior after the adoption of term limits. 46 They assume that term
limits impose "a certain end to the political game between the voters
and the legislator."47 In contrast, the current system is characterized
by probabilistic end periods; that is, no player is sure which term will
end the game. Cohen and Spitzer suggest that the existence of proba-
bilistic end periods is one solution to a prisoners' dilemma that causes
legislators to behave contrary to their constituents' desires and consis-
tent with the agendas of interest groups.48 Cohen and Spitzer charac-
terize the relevant prisoners' dilemma as follows: voters cooperate by
reelecting their representatives and defect by not doing so; legislators
cooperate by serving constituent interests and defect by serving their
self-interest. (Cohen and Spitzer assume the latter diverge.) Unless
voters and legislators have some way to cooperate, the possibility of
defection is great which means constituent interests will go unserved.
As long as legislators face the threat of defeat, they will cooperate, but
this mechanism cannot prevent defection in their last term. Thus, if
voters know which term will be a legislator's last, they will not reelect
her to her final term. Accordingly, she will defect in her next to last
term, voters will anticipate that and defect in this earlier election, and
so on, until cooperation unravels completely.49 If there are no certain
end periods, however, then there is a chance that each period will be
the last-and a chance that it will not. If the likelihood that the legis-
lator will continue to serve is high enough, then cooperation may be
sustained.50
Thus, term limits appear to defeat this solution to the prisoners'
dilemma by enacting certain end periods to legislator terms. But if
progressive ambition is the prevalent strategy of politicians con-
strained by term limits, the political game will still have probabilistic
end periods as politicians run for a series of jobs with overlapping
constituencies. In other words, term limits cause certain end periods
with respect to particular jobs,51 but not with respect to political ca-
reers. This uncertainty is similar to the uncertainty that acts to miti-
gate the prisoners' dilemma now, where voters know that a legislator
will ultimately come to the end of her service either through death or
46 Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 4, at 477-79.
47 Id. at 508.
48 Id. at 500-06.
49 Id. at 498-99.
50 Id. at 504-05. Cooperation may also be encouraged, even when the probability that
a particular term will be the last is high, by altering the payoff for cooperation. Id. at 500,
505.
51 Of course, a politician need not remain in one office until the term limit forces her
to leave; thus, the certainty of the end period even with respect to the particular job is
questionable. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (noting the possibility that office-
holders will leave early to take advantage of open seats in other parts of the political oppor-
tunity structure).
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retirement. Legislators will also cooperate because .voters are unlikely
to elect candidates with a history of defecting in the larger political
game.
Thus, determining whether progressive ambition will survive
term limits is crucial. At first glance, term limits do not appear to
inhibit progressive ambition significantly. A politician can serve in the
House for twelve years and then continue her career in the Senate for
another twelve years. She can plan to spend some time in the state
legislature, the governor's office, or in the executive branch if she
hopes for a longer career in public service. This analysis misses the
mark, however. The relevant question for a prospective professional
candidate is not the length of time that she may possibly serve in polit-
ical offices; the important question is whether the expected return on
a lengthy political career will be sufficient to justify her investment of
time, money, and energy.
Term limitations make an uninterrupted political career much
more difficult than it is now. Currently, once a candidate is elected to
one body of Congress, she can be relatively certain of long tenure
because of the great advantages of incumbency in campaigns.52
Under term limits, a careerist needs to move up the political opportu-
nity structure to remain in elected office, but the probability of unim-
peded upward movement decreases as the number of available
positions that are perceived as advancements decline.5 3 In some
52 See JOHN I HIBBING, CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS: CONTOURS OF LIFE IN THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 43-46 (1991); John Rt Alford & David W. Brady, Personal and
Partisan Advantage in U.S. Congressional Elections, 1846-1986, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED
153, 156-58, 163-64 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989);
Charles S. Bullock,- III, House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition, 66 Am.
POL. Sm. REv. 1295, 1295 (1972)
53 Much of Professor Schlesinger's work on political ambition discusses the opportu-
nity structure that shapes ambition. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 11-12, 16-21. Before
Schlesinger's study, many perceived the political career structure as hopelessly muddled.
See, e.g., HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PoLITIcs 303 (1960) ("In American
politics the escalator to the top is not a regimented, orderly lift, but a tangle of ladders,
ropes, and runways that attract people from other activities at various stages of the process,
and lead others to a dead end or a blind drop."). The opportunity structure is logical,
however. For example, Schlesinger identified a number of "manifest offices," or offices
with numerous obvious conditions which link them together and make movement among
them likely. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 90-102. A common path to the Senate'
begins with a base office in the state legislature and then leads to the U.S. Congress as the
penultimate elected office. See id. at 92 (creating a frequency tree of prior careers of sena-
tors). This opportunity structure is unsurprising because federal and state legislative jobs
fit easily into the concept of manifest offices. First, they have obvious functional similari-
ties. Id. at 99-100. Second, their constituencies overlap. State legislators have constituen-
cies that are part of House districts, and depending on the size of the state legislatures, the
degree of overlap may be substantial. Rohde, supra note 42, at 9 ("One thing that will have
a substantial impact on voter recognition is the degree of overlap between the constituency
a prospective candidate presently represents and the constituency he would like to repre-
sent."); D. Eric Schansberg, Moving Out of the House: An Analysis of Congressional Quits, 32
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states, the pyramid narrows sharply between state legislative positions
and U.S. House of Representatives positions. For example, in Wyo-
ming, which applies term limits at the state level, the state house con-
sists of sixty representatives who are limited to no more than six years
of service in any twelve-year period, and thirty state senators who are
limited to no more than twelve years of service in any twenty-four year
period. When progressively-ambitious state legislators consider the
federal legislature, they must be painfully aware that Wyoming is rep-
resented by only one person in the House and two in the Senate. In
most states, the cinch tightens significantly between the House and
the Senate. California, which also has term limits at the state level, has
eighty seats in the state assembly, forty state senate seats, fifty-two U.S.
representatives-but only two U.S. senators. This winnowing effect is
particularly pronounced because a race for the Senate is likely to at-
tract not only many federal representatives, but also the governor,
other state-wide elected officials, and high-profile mayors from large
cities.
If forced to run for higher office, the prospective candidate,
weighing the chances of a career in politics, cannot be certain that she
will move steadily through a succession of elected offices. This change
in her chances for a career in politics is not because term limits de-
crease the probability of success in, for example, a U.S. Senate race
after she has served in the House of Representatives. Indeed, my anal-
ysis will suggest that success may be more likely after the adoption of
term limits. The problem is that, even if the chances improve, the
probability of successfully moving to a higher office will remain lower
than the probability in the current system of being reelected indefi-
nitely. Yet, under term limits, the only way to sustain a political career
is to hold a series of political jobs.
The preceding analysis is a static one, however. To think of the
political opportunity structure as immutable or as comprising only
elected offices is a mistake. Term limits will result in various altera-
tions in the available political opportunities that may convince a pro-
spective candidate that a political career remains a viable prospect,
notwithstanding the need to move periodically to different positions.
As a result, the legislature will continue to be largely professional even
with term limits. The shape of the political opportunity structure will
ECON. INQuIRY 445, 453-54 (1994) (finding that representatives from less populous states
more often exhibit progressive ambition because of the large overlap of constituencies).
Interaction among officeholders in all these jobs is frequent enough to provoke ambition
in those holding the less desirablejobs and to allow them to envision themselves in the new
role. SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 100.
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change to fit the new realities of a "term-limited world." As politi-
cians' expectations change, so will the opportunity structure. 54
After the adoption of term limits, a U.S. representative may more
frequently consider moving back to a state position, a tendency now
negatively referred to as "regressive ambition,"55 although notable pol-
iticians often returned to state office in earlier eras when states were
relatively more powerful.56 With term limits, the political opportunity
structure may again include state offices at its higher levels. By serving
in a state position, a former U.S. representative may increase her
chance for success in a future election for the Senate, particularly if
the state office encompasses different or larger constituencies or of-
fers an opportunity for greater name recognition. Moreover, the abil-
54 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 19 (noting that wars, economic changes, and
political changes cause the political opportunity structure to change). Perhaps the oppor-
tunity structure will remain the same, although that outcome seems unlikely because the
structure is a response to the institutional constraints that shape political life. If the struc-
ture does not change to accommodate altered career expectations, people's preferences
for risk may become the central factor in their decision to pursue political careers. Several
studies on risk preferences and political ambition have been undertaken. See, e.g., Rohde,
supra note 42; Abramson et al., supra note 42; see also Paul Brace, Progressive Ambition in the
House: A Probabilistic Approach, 46J. OF POL 556, 567 (1984) (finding that measurements of
risk-bearing tendencies are not sufficiently refined and provide weak results). Unfortu-
nately, although these studies suggest that risk-bearing propensities vary among politicians,
see, e.g., Abramson et al., supra note 42, at 12, they do not measure their strength or their
distribution. Nor do the studies shed any light on whether a politician who must either
retire or seek another office because of term limits will exhibit stronger risk-bearing char-
acteristics than a politician who can also choose to satisfy ambition statically.
55 Gary W. Copeland, Term Limitations and Political Careers in Oklahoma: In, Out, Up, or
Down, in LIMITING LEGISLATvE TERMS, supra note 5, at 139, 147. Term limits on state legis-
lators in California have apparently increased the incidence of regressive ambition as some
assembly members have sought local offices, such as positions on the boards of supervisors
in large counties or on city councils in major cities. See ELIZABETH A. CAPELL, TERM LIMrrs
AND INTE sr GROUPS: PREDIGrIONS FOR CALIFORNIA (Institute of Governmental Studies,
University of California at Berkeley Working Paper 94-1, 1994); Mark Gladstone, Capitol
JournaL Legislators Look Homeward for Future in Politics, LA. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at A3.
56 George Will has noted the decline of regressive ambition in modem politics:
During the Jeffersonian era congressmen came and went with what today
seems remarkable rapidity. Politicians passed through Congress and then
often passed on to, or back to, what we now consider, anachronistically,
"lower" offices. "A typical career sequence early in the nineteenth century
would be local office, state office, U.S. House, and back to the state House."
WILL, supra note 7, at 84 (quoting Samuel Kemell, Toward Understanding 19th Centuy Con-
gressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation, 21 AM. J. POL SO. 669 (1977)). For
example, John Quincy Adams served for seventeen years in the House of Representatives
after he left the Presidency. Lu ANN PALE-rA & FRED L. WORTH, ALMANAC OF PRESIDENTIAL
FACTS 37 (1988). John Tyler was elected to the Confederate House of Representatives after
his service as President of the United States. Id. at 52. Several of the early Speakers of the
House left the federal legislature to serve in state government: Speaker Varnum (1807-
1810) served in the U.S. Senate and then in the Massachusetts State Senate; Speaker Taylor
(1820, 1825-1826) served in the New York State Senate after he left the House; and
Speaker Jones (1843-1844) was later a representative to the Virginia House of Delegates.
Nelson W. Polsby, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. POL Sci.
REv. 144, 148, 150 (1968) [hereinafter Polsby, Institutionalization].
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ity to use a state position either as a springboard or as a place to wait
until the chance for advancement improves may make such jobs rela-
tively desirable. Indeed, after the adoption of term limits, the tempo-
rary movement to state office should be termed "cyclical" ambition,
rather than "regressive" ambition, because the negative connotations
will be largely removed.
The political opportunity structure comprises many jobs, not all
of them elected. Movement to non-elected political positions is also
possible, either as an alternate career path or as a strategic choice to
improve a candidate's chances for higher elected office in the future.
Such political positions include jobs in the private sector or with polit-
ical parties.
In addition to changing the pattern of office-holding (or, more
expansively, politicaljob-holding), term limits will also affect many of
the critical factors that determine whether a politician is likely to at-
tain the next position along the opportunity structure. If these
changes increase the likelihood that a candidate will continue to win
as she moves along her career path then she will still be willing to
embark on a political career. To understand how term limits affect
the factors relevant to the decision to run for office, we need to ana-
lyze what considerations a candidate weighs when making her choice.
C. Changes in the Factors Considered by a
Prospective Candidate
A person assessing whether she will pursue a career in politics
makes her decision strategically,57 weighing the risks of running, the
benefits of success, and the options after failure. When a candidate
decides whether to run for an office, her decisionmaking process can
be characterized in the following way:
U = P (Bw) + (1 - P) (BL) - C
where:
Uis the utility of running for a particular office;
P is the probability of winning the office;
Bw is the benefit of the office that the candidate perceives;
1 - P is the probability of losing the election for the office;
BL is the perceived benefit of the activity that she expects to engage
in if she loses; and
57 See GARY C. JAcoBsoN & SAMUEL KERNELL, STRATEGY AND CHOICE IN CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS (1981) (formulating a theory of the strategic politician).
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Cis the cost associated with running, which includes the net cost of
the campaign and the value of any currently held political office or
other opportunity that she foregoes if she decides to run.5 8
As long as Uis greater than zero and the benefits of alternative activi-
ties are not greater than U, the prospective candidate will decide to
run for office.
If term limits affect the value of the terms of this calculation so
that running for another office remains an attractive option after the
candidate's term has expired, a careerist should remain in politics. In
other words, if the political environment adapts to term limits in ways
that compensate for the impossibility of indefinite reelection, the pro-
fessional politician will remain. I will assume, for the immediate dis-
cussion, that the shortened term of office is the only relevant change
in the nature of the political office caused by term limits. 5 9
Another challenge involved in analyzing the effect of term limits
on a politician's career decisions is the presence of feedback effects
that make the analysis seem circular: the effect of term limits on the
terms in the calculation depends on whether other potential candi-
dates still consider politics an attractive career after their adoption.
But we do not know the effect of term limits on careerism until we
know how the terms in the calculation will change. For example, both
the probability of success and the cost of campaigns-critical factors
in determining the value of U-are affected by the number of candi- -
dates in any particular race, and the number of candidates depends in
large part on the value of U. If an increase in U attracts more candi-
dates, then the net cost of each campaign will rise and the probability
of success will decline, causing a reduction in U.60 This problem is
faced in other contexts by economists and social scientists.6 1 The
presence of feedback effects means that the magnitude of any change
in Umay be reduced, but I assume that these secondary effects will not
dominate the primary effect. In other words, any reduction in U
caused by increased competitiveness will not overwhelm the increase
58 This calculus is based on the empirical work in Black, supra note 40, at 146 and
JACOBSON & KERNELL, supra note 57, at 22. See also Timothy Groseclose & Keith Krehbiel,
Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102d Hous 38 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 75, 78-79 (1994) (offering a similar model).
59 It is likely that term limits will change the nature of the legislative office by altering
the benefits that politicians-whether careerist or amateur-can extract from the office.
This complex and less frequently studied issue is considered infra part IV.
60 Perhaps a more accurate depiction of the decisionmaking process is the following-
U P(N(U), I) x Bsv + (1 - P(N(U))) x BL - C(N(U), I)
where the new terms are
N is the number of candidates in a particular election; and
I is the presence of an incumbent in an election.
I am particularly indebted to Dick Craswell for our discussion of this issue.
61 FRANKLIN FISHER, EcoNoMETRIcs: ESSAYS IN THEORY AND APPLICATION 72-73 (1992).
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in the value of U that results in the increased competitiveness. My
analysis of the prospective candidate's decision therefore focuses only
on the change in her utility, holding constant every other prospective
candidate's utility. If, under these conditions, Uincreases, we would
expect more candidates to run for office,62 mitigating, but not elimi-
nating, the positive effect on U.
1. Term Limits' Effect on the Probability of Success in a Campaign
for a Particular Office (P)
The political science literature demonstrates that the most impor-
tant variable in electoral success is incumbency. Despite the publi-
cized upsets of a few incumbent lawmakers in recent elections,
incumbents remain virtually invincible in their bids for reelection. 63
Because of this intimidating reality, serious challenges to incumbents
are now relatively rare.6 Perhaps the primary reason a progressively-
ambitious politician avoids challenging an incumbent is the absence
of term limits. As long as a politician does not face term limits in her
current office, she is apt to be relatively patient because she can re-
62 Preliminary studies of state elections after the adoption of term limits suggest that
the reform does increase electoral competition. See KAMBER, supra note 16, at 35-36 (con-
cluding that term limits at state level increased the number of candidates for elected of-
fices, but decrying this increase in choice as "chaos"); Kermit Daniel & John R. Lott, Jr.,
Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: California's State Legislative Rules, 14-15
(Mar. 4, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review) (term limits
in California increased the number of major party candidates, decreased the margin of
victory in elections, and decreased the number of elections with only one candidate);John
R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are Increasing: The
Government is Getting Bigger, 23 (Nov. 13, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter Lott, Simple Explanation). But see KAMBER, supra note
16, at 44 (concluding that term limits in Oklahoma decreased competition but offering no
explanation for this outcome).
63 Before the relatively tumultuous elections of 1992 and 1994, incumbent House
members enjoyed reelection rates of more than 95%. Robert S. Erikson & Gerald C.
Wright, Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED,
supra note 36, at 91, 99. And, the reelection rate for incumbents in the last two elections
has not dipped substantially. The lowest rate of 88% occurred in the Senate in 1992 when
23 of 26 incumbents seeking reelection were returned. The other reelection rates for that
year exceeded 90%. Elizabeth Neuffer, Class of '92 Holds Reformers, Not Radicals, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1992, at 20; Kevin Bouffard, Quick Change Expectations Unrealistic, TAMPA
TRIB., Nov. 21, 1994, at H1.
64 See Gary C. Jacobson, The Misallocation of Resources in House Campaigns, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 36, at 115, 127-28 fig. 5-6 (showing that an increasing number of
incumbents faced no challenger at all; that a large number of challengers are so poorly
funded that the incumbent effectively faced no opposition for reelection; and concluding
that 80% of incumbents faced no real challenge in general elections); see also Wayne L.
Francis, House to Senate Career Movement in the U.S. States: The Significance of Selectivity, 18
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 309, 314 tbl. 1 (1993) (finding that when members of the lower state
houses seek to move to the upper body, they run for open seats 78% of the time rather
then challenging an incumbent).
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main there until the incumbent in the higher office retires.65 Term
restrictions set a limit on her patience; thus, she is much more likely
to consider running against an incumbent.
Although challenges to incumbents in the current system are un-
likely to succeed, term limits may change matters. In fact, such a sig-
nificant institutional change will likely diminish substantially the
current invulnerability of incumbents. John R. Lott, Jr., has identified
a barrier to entry in the political market-an incumbent politician's
"brand name"-that decreases the number of challenges to incum-
bents and makes successful challenges both unlikely and costly.66 An
incumbent running for reelection has already made a significant in-
vestment in her political brand name. In previous campaigns, she has
compiled lists of donors and supporters that she can update and use
at a cost vastly lower than the initial cost to produce such resources.
She has already spent campaign funds to acquaint the voters with her
name and her philosophy of governing. An incumbent has developed
a "home style" that engenders warm and positive feelings in potential
voters, and she has spent enormous amounts of time performing con-
stituent service like casework or project assistance. 67 Many congres-
sional institutions are designed to aid incumbents in establishing and
reinforcing name recognition among voters relatively cheaply and eas-
ily.68 This part of a legislator's job can be labeled "advertising."69 In-
cumbent advertising assumes a variety of forms: frequent visits home
at taxpayer expense; noncontroversial speeches advocating symbolic
responses to problems; and the use of the Senate or House recording
studio and franked mail to communicate with constituents.
65 Her willingness to wait may also be a function of her preference for risk. For a
discussion of the role of risk-taking in the decision-to-run calculus, see supra note 54.
66 SeeJohn R. Lott, Jr., Brand Names and Barriers to Entry in Political Markets, 51 PUB.
CHOICE 87, 87-88 (1986) [hereinafter Lott, Brand Names]; John R_ Lott, Jr., The Effect of
Nontransferable Property Rights on the Efficiency of Political Markets, 32J. PUB. ECON. 231 (1987)
[hereinafter Lott, Nontransferable Property]; cf. MoRIS P. FIOmiNA, CONGRESS: K EYSTONE OF
THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 101 (2d ed. 1989) (noting that "the strength of challeng-
ers is in part determined by the strength of incumbents. An incumbent with a history of
comfortable margins, an overflowing war chest, and a reputation for invincibility scares any
ambitious prosecutors and state legislators who are natural antagonists."). See also infra text
accompanying notes 102-04 (discussing these investments as a reason politicians are likely
to exhibit progressive ambition once they are in office).
67 See RcCHAR F. FENNO, JR., HOME STvLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DiSTRicTs 101
(1978) (defining constituent service).
68 Justice Thomas recognized these advantages in his dissent in U.S. Term Limits and
argued that term limits would help to level the playing field for challengers. U.S. Term
Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1911 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also ALAN
EHRENHALT, THE UNITED STATES OFAMBITION 230-31 (1991) (describingwhy Congress is an
"incumbent protection society").
69 See, e.g., DAVID P. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTroRAL CoNNEcrION 49 (1974) (de-
fining advertising as the effort to "disseminate one's name among constituents in such a
fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little or no issue content");
see also infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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A challenger, even a strong one, cannot easily acquire a compara-
ble political brand name. Developing this human capital outside the
political arena is difficult.70 Moreover, the market for political brand
names is imperfect. Unlike a new firm that can purchase a well-known
brand name from another firm and immediately benefit from its accu-
mulated goodwill, a new politician cannot purchase a retiring politi-
cian's brand name and succeed to her goodwill.71 An endorsement
from a well-respected and popular incumbent is not the same as the
incumbent running herself; the new candidate must make further in-
vestments to convince voters that she sincerely shares the ideology of
her endorser. The endorsement is helpful information to the voters,
as is party affiliation, but voters need other credible indications that
the signal is accurate and that the affiliation is not merely strategic. 72
In addition, a political brand name is a largely nontransferable
asset because a challenger cannot literally buy another's brand name
without violating bribery or campaign finance laws. 73 Moreover, in-
vestments in a political brand name are largely unsalvageable. With-
out an ability to transfer this investment to another, a politician will
reasonably decide to continue her career in politics and to continue
to receive a return on her investment. As an incumbent remains in
office, her investment in brand name increases, which requires larger
initial expenditures by challengers to develop comparable reputa-
tions. The barriers to entry into the political market become corre-
spondingly more formidable. 74
By limiting tenure in any one office, term limits may decrease
incumbents' ability to invest in office-specific political brand names,
70 A political brand name can be produced through activities other than holding
political office. For example, General Colin Powell has invested significantly in this asset
without holding elected office. Fame is not always a substitute for political renown, how-
ever. To the extent that voters engage in sorting, that is, electing persons who share their
ideology, general information about the candidate is often unhelpful in evaluating her
philosophy of governing. Also, fame is seldom accompanied by the network of political
support that is so important in modern politics.
71 See Lott, Brand Names, supra note 66, at 87-88 (discussing the difference between
brand names of firms and political brand names in terms of their transferability); Lott,
Nontransferable Property, supra note 66, at 232-33 (same).
72 The question of political brand names is an example of information costs. Voters
desire to elect politicians who share their ideologies so that they are not required to moni-
tor their agents as closely as they might otherwise. Because information about ideology is
costly and difficult to verify, those who have established their brand names through prior
campaigns and political service are at an advantage relative to newcomers.
73 See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 49-50.
74 Given that these investments by the incumbent are sunk, he need only
cover his marginal cost of creating transfers to remain in office. The chal-
lenger, on the other hand, must not only cover his marginal costs but ex-
pect a competitive return on his expenditure of campaign funds. If the
incumbent has made sufficiently large past investments, it will not pay the
challenger to invest the amount required to win.
Lott, Nontransferable Property, supra note 66, at 240-41.
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thereby reducing their current virtual invulnerability.7 5 Of course,
even term-limited incumbents will retain some advantages in the de-
velopment of political brand names because of the resources they
have developed in past, albeit fewer, campaigns and through their ser-
vice in office. A politician with progressive ambition will still have a
significant amount of investment sunk in her political reputation and
will have developed the valuable campaign infrastructure of volun-
teers and donor lists. For each new office, however, a candidate will
need to make new investments targeted to the new constituency. The
need to continue building and refining political brand name may
therefore close the resource gap between incumbents and
challengers.
The dynamic changes wrought by the adoption of term limits sug-
gest that the incumbency advantage will be further diluted as many
races will pit incumbents against one another. Incumbents of term-
limited offices who have reached the ends of their terms may choose
to challenge an incumbent of a new and desirable office.76 If a chal-
lenger has been serving in an office that allowed for extensive advertis-
ing to the constituents of the new office, the nominal incumbent's
comparative advantage may be slim indeed. If a challenger's current
constituency overlaps with the incumbent's, the ability to engage in
such advertising is enhanced. In her last term, a strategic, progres-
sively-ambitious politician can target her advertising activities toward
her new constituency, because her current constituents cannot exert
discipline by refusing to reelect her.77
75 See Daniel & Lott, supra note 62, at 13-14 (suggesting that, after term limits, incum-
bents will become more vulnerable over the long term).
76 However, races between incumbents may not increase in frequency if political par-
ties, made stronger by term limits, enforce an orderly process to discourage races between
incumbents of the same party. For a discussion of how political parties may control legisla-
tors after the adoption of term limits, see infra text accompanying notes 213-223.
77 Although the emphasis of her advertising may shift, the progressively-ambitious
politician should still vote consistently with her past voting record because of her sincere
ideological preferences and because severe divergence will tarnish her political brand
name in future campaigns. SeeJohn R. Lott, Jr. & Stephen G. Bronars, Time Series Evidence
on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives, 76 PUB. CHoICE 125, 128-33 (1993); James
vanBeek, Does the Decision to Retire Increase the Amount of Political Shirking?, 19 POL. FIN. Q.
444, 447-49 (1991) (finding no "statistically significant change in voting behavior" of those
aspiring to higher office). But see Mark A. Zupan, The Last Period Problem in Politics: Do
Congressional Representatives Not Subject to a Reelection Constraint Alter Their Voting Behavior?, 65
PuB. CHOICE 167, 171 (1990) (finding that aspiring candidates alter their voting behavior
to appeal to "a broader and different constituency than the one they contemporaneously
represent"); see also CA.En, supra note 5, at 171, 175 (suggesting that aspiring representa-
tives with extremist ideologies tend to moderate their positions in their last terms to attract
broader constituencies). The former studies may be more persuasive because they utilize
more sensitive measures of voting behavior. Compare Lott & Bronars, supra, at 128-33 (us-
ing five voting indices to measure voting behavior) and vanBeek, supra, at 447-49 (four
voting indices) with Zupan, supra, at 171 (relying on a single voting index-the Americans
for Democratic Action index).
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Thus, after term limits, prospective candidates will be more will-
ing to embark on serious campaigns against incumbents. At the same
time, as incumbents are forced to leave after twelve years, prospective
candidates are more likely to find opportunities to run for open seats
and thus avoid the more difficult task of challenging an incumbent.
Indeed, some commentators believe that politics will begin to resem-
ble a game of musical chairs as prospective candidates postpone run-
ning for an office until it becomes open. 78 Some politicians will not
find this "musical chairs" strategy appealing, however, if they lose their
current office because of a term limit and find all other desirable posi-
tions filled by incumbents. Candidates may not wish to wait for an
opening for several reasons. First, an ambitious prospective candidate
cannot be certain that her wait for an open seat will last no more than
twelve years. After all, incumbents are defeated, and a successful chal-
lenge means that the twelve-year clock starts again for the hesitant
politician.
In addition, a person interested in a political career can generate
a political reputation by running against an incumbent, even without
expecting to win in that particular election. This political strategy can
be adopted currently by prospective candidates. But now if the chal-
lenger miscalculates, her initial challenge may occur well before the
incumbent's retirement date, and her investment in political brand
name will have depreciated significantly by the time the seat comes
open. Term limitations reduce this risk. Thus, challengers are likely
to test the political waters in the incumbent's next-to-last term in of-
fice. 79 Such a situation will increase the chance that the incumbent
will be defeated in this election, thereby increasing the likelihood that
serious challengers will run in the election for the "next-to-the-next-to-
last" term to build their brand names, and so on.
The number of open seats will increase as term limits force in-
cumbents out of offices at regular intervals. In addition, in a system
where movement among offices is required, an incumbent may leave
her current position early if a favorable opportunity to move higher in
the structure presents itself, thereby opening the seat before the
78 See Hibbing, supra note 36, at 69 (noting possibility that term limits will become
ceilings on service as well as limitations); JeffreyJ. Mondak, Elections as Filters: Term Limits
and the Composition of the House, 48 Poi- REs. Q. 701, 718 (1995) ("By ensuring that seats
become open at fixed intervals, term limits may reduce the incentive for prospective candi-
dates to challenge incumbents ... ."). Professor Brace notes that, although an incumbent
senator running for her second term usually faces more challengers than a more senior
senator, an incumbent governor seeking her second term is more successful at reducing
the threat of a challenge by a member of the House. Brace, supra note 54, at 563-64. The
willingness of challengers to wait until the governor must leave office because of term
limits may explain this difference.
79 See Daniel & Lott, supra note 62, at 5-6.
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twelve years has elapsed.80 Thus, compared to the status quo, term
limits increase the probability that a prospective candidate can pro-
gress higher in the political opportunity structure. Even if such a can-
didate finds herself with no choice but to challenge an incumbent or
to leave politics, the dynamic changes caused by term limits in the
nature of incumbency increase the likelihood of a successful
challenge.
2. The Cost of the Decision to Run for a Particular Office (C)
The cost of running for the federal legislature has two compo-
nents: one that affects only current officeholders and one that affects
all prospective candidates. The first cost is the value of any currently
held office that one who aspires to a different office must vacate in
order to run.8' This cost is obviously affected by the imposition of
term limits. In many cases, the presence of term limits eliminates the
cost; a term-limited politician must leave her office whether or not she
plans to run for higher office. In a world without term limits, on the
other hand, the opportunity cost to the incumbent of not running for
virtually certain reelection can be the most significant factor in a deci-
sion not to seek higher office.8 2 Not only does the incumbent know
that a bid for higher office will cause her to lose the power and pres-
tige that she wields in her current position, but if the seniority system
80 In California, for example, politicians are frequently leaving mid-term to run for
other offices or taking non-elected political jobs before state term limits force them out.
Between 1992 and 1994, the state held twelve special elections for state assembly seats, at a
significant cost to taxpayers. See Peter Schrag, The Populist Road to HelL" Term Limits in Cali-
fornia, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1996, at 24-27; see also Kamber, supra note 16, at 94-95 (dis-
cussing examples of early exits by public officials).
81 C includes all opportunity costs of the decision to run for a particular office, includ-
ing opportunities other than running for reelection. However, most opportunities, other
than running for reelection, are not entirely lost by the decision to enter the campaign.
Although her candidacy may temporarily interrupt her career in the non-political sector,
most opportunities typically remain open to the candidate. If she succeeds in her bid for
higher office, she can always resign to take advantage of such opportunities if they become
sufficiently attractive (for example, if she is offered an appointed political office or an
attractive job outside politics, perhaps as a university president). If she is unsuccessful, she
can pursue other opportunities because she will need a job. In my equation, (1-P) (Bt)
includes the expected value of forced retirement. Thus, the benefits of these opportuni-
ties are more appropriately considered as a cost of winning the election, not of entering it.
There are few opportunities available for such a limited time that they can be considered
opportunity costs of the decision to run for office. To the extent they exist, term limits will
not affect them.
82 SeeJACOBsON & KERNtLL, supra note 57, at 25. This factor is not determinative,
however. For example, Professors Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde found that some sena-
tors were willing to run for the office of president even though they had to give up their
seats in the Senate to do so. Abramson et al., supra note 42, at 19-20. The cost of waiting
for another chance to run for president may have outweighed the importance of reelection
status in a year when no incumbent of the same party was running or a divided convention
seemed likely. Id. at 19.
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favors those who display long-term static ambition, she will give up
increased power in the future.
Clearly, term limits will profoundly decrease the value of C for a
current officeholder who considers running for another office. This
change in opportunity costs increases the chance that she will seek
higher office. In an analogous context, governors who face restricted
terms of office tend to display progressive ambition more often than
their counterparts in the House of Representatives.8 3 Anecdotal evi-
dence from California concerning state legislators facing the bite of
term limits suggests that they are more willing to consider bids for
federal positions because of the reduced, or nonexistent, cost of giv-
ing up their current offices.84 Similarly, some research suggests that
members of the House who believe that they are vulnerable in a re-
election campaign are more willing to seek higher office than incum-
bents who do not feel threatened.8 5 As a result, it is reasonable to
conclude that term limits decrease the cost of this factor in the candi-
date's decision.
Second, term limits will affect the other major factor in the value
of C-the net cost of campaigns. Campaign cost is an important con-
sideration for all candidates, especially those making their initial deci-
sion to run for political office. Currently, competitive campaigns,
races for open seats, and races in which the incumbent faces a serious
challenge are quite expensive.8 6 As the discussion of political brand
83 SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 18 (noting that governors were candidates "for
whom the risks of seeking advancement are either negligible or for whom there are no
risks at all").
84 A California state senator recently noted: "It would be naive to think that many
legislators are not eyeing new congressional seats to be established and perhaps hoping for
a restructuring of districts which may well serve their best interests where there is no term
limitation." Charles M. Price, The Guillotine Comes to California: Term-Limit Politics in the
Golden State, in LIMrITNG LEGIsLATWE TERMS, supra note 5, at 128.
85 Brace, supra note 54, at 565. Professor Brace bases his conclusion on evidence that
a member of Congress who faces reelection after a harmful redistricting is more likely to
run for higher office. Id. at 559. An alternate explanation for this finding is that such
redistricting occurs after the incumbent indicates to party officials that she plans to run for
higher office or that the lawmaker's acquiescence in redistricting is purchased at the price
of the party supporting her in the next campaign.
86 A serious challenge is one where the incumbent either loses or receives less than
60% of the vote. In 1992, a challenger in a close Senate race spent, on average, $2,518,456,
while the average expenditure for a candidate in a race for an open seat was $2,827,209.
DwiGHT MOmS & MURIELLE E. GAMACHE, HANDBOOK OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING: MONEY IN
THE 1992 CONGRESSIONAL RACES 7 (1994). In 1994, the average expenditure in an open
race was $2,998,615.80; a challenger in a close race spent $3,100,201 (if one excludes the
atypically expensive Huffington-Feinstein and North-Robb races). See PHILIP D. DUNCAN &
CHRPSTINE C. I.AWRENCE, PoLTICS IN AMERICA 1996: THE 104TH CONGRESS 1508-31 (Cong.
Q. Inc. ed., 1995) (providing campaign finance data for House members and their gen-
eral-election opponents in the 1992 and 1994 elections; providing same data for senators).
The House figures are also illuminating. In 1994, an average challenger in a close House
race spent $411,132.54, and a candidate for an open seat spent $577,107.51. See id.
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names indicated, however, term limits may reduce the costs of cam-
paigns, especially those against incumbents. If incumbents have
smaller investments in their political brand names, serious challengers
will not need to spend as much to compete. Preliminary evidence
from races in states with term limits indicates that campaign expendi-
tures have declined.8 7 The precise cause of such declines is unclear,
but the reduction in the value of political brand names and changes
in interest group activity are probably contributing factors. If interest
groups, for example, believe that the legislative output they desire is
worth less after the adoption of term limits, candidates will find it
more difficult to raise money from these groups and will be unable to
maintain the high-cost campaigns, that we observe now.8s
The combined effect of eliminating the opportunity costs of a
politician's leaving her current position and decreasing net campaign
costs means that C is likely to decline. Considering this change to-
gether with the increase in the probability of success (P) caused both
by the increase in the number of open seats and the weakening of
incumbent invulnerability, progressively-ambitious candidates may be
convinced that political careers remain possible under term limits. Af-
ter all, they will have little to lose by running and much to gain. Thus,
professional politicians will have incentives to enter and remain in
politics.
3. The Remaining Terms in the Calculation
The benefit that the aspirant associates with higher office (Bw) is
crucial to her decision to seek that office. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant benefit of the office is the degree to which it allows a politician to
achieve her goals and objectives, whatever those might be.8 9 Again, I
am assuming that federal elective offices will continue to allow legisla-
tors to satisfy the same objectives in the same way that they do now;
later, I discuss whether that assumption is valid. Under such an as-
sumption, term limits appear to decrease the benefits of office-hold-
ing because politicians retain those benefits for a shorter time. With
term limits, a politician will have just twelve years to enjoy the power
(figures calculated from data provided in the book). Races between two incumbents, more
frequent after the adoption of term limits, can be staggeringly expensive for all the candi-
dates involved. For example, Senator Alphonse D'Amato spent nearly $12 million in his
1992 reelection race; his opponent, the state Attorney General, spent $6.4 million. Id. at
127.
87 See Daniel & Lott, supra note 62, at 10-18 (finding that campaign expenditures in
California declined as a result of term limits, and isolating this effect from the effect of
changes in state campaign finance laws); Lott, Simple Explanation, supra note 62, at 23
(suggesting that campaign expenditures decrease after the adoption of state term limits).
88 See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
89 See infra text at note 114 (discussing objectives of legislators).
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and influence of her office. Under the current system, it is probable
that she will remain in office for much longer.90
On the other hand, the reduction of legislative tenures may actu-
ally increase the perceived value of an elected office by shortening the
time required for a legislator to reach a leadership position. Assum-
ing that the seniority system remains intact after the ratification of a
term limits amendment,91 members of Congress will be eligible to
serve in leadership roles or on powerful and prestigious committees in
about half the time that it currently takes. Applying their continua-
tion rate methodology to a term-limited House of Representatives,
Professors Reed and Schansberg estimate the time it will take mem-
bers to reach a rank in the 80th percentile, the seniority rank usually
required to serve as a chairman or tanking member of a committee, a
party leader, or a chairman of a significant subcommittee. In the
102nd Congress, a member reached this seniority ranking after six-
teen years of service.92 After the adoption of a six-term limit, however,
a House member will reach the 80th percentile after only six, and
eventually eight, years.93 Thus, although members will wield power
for a shorter period of time under term limits, they will assume power-
ful positions much earlier. This more concentrated value of the office
may offset the reduction in value caused by shorter tenure.
Of course, the benefits of a political office are not limited to
those the lawmaker enjoys while in office. Many political offices are
springboards to other more prestigious political offices, some of
which are filled by appointment. Elected office also provides experi-
ence that can lead to lucrative private employment. A person contem-
plating a run for a particular office will consider this "springboard
value" which depends on a variety of factors, including the overlap of
constituencies and the similarity ofjob functions.94 For example, ex-
perience in a state or local deliberative body equips a politician with
90 The dynamic changes that are likely to result from an imposition of term limits may
well reduce the expected tenure in either the House or the Senate to a level below the
upper limit allowed by the constitutional amendment. A shortening of the period during
which a prospective candidate expects to reap the benefits of a particular office will reduce
its value accordingly.
91 Of course, it is likely that the seniority system in its current form will not survive the
adoption of term limitations. See discussion infra part IV.A If the seniority system is re-
placed by a system with less certain rules of advancement, legislators will have the opportu-
nity to assume influential posts even earlier in their careers, but retaining power will be
more susceptible to political vagaries.
92 Reed & Schansberg, Impact of Congressional Term Limits, supra note 5, at 84. This
figure may increase. Using the continuation rate for 1985-1991, by the turn of the century,
it will take twenty-two years to reach this rank. Id. The sixteen year figure remains virtually
unchanged if the 1977-1991 continuation rate is used. Id.
93 Id.
94 See discussion of manifest ties between state and federal legislative offices supra note
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skills that she will use in the federal legislature; similarly, experience
on congressional committees gives the politician substantive expertise
to use in a particular private sector job or in an appointed position.
Term limits will cause little change in the suitability of an office
for use as a political springboard, except that the other offices may
also be subject to term limits and thus offer benefits for less time than
they do now. In addition, term limits may reduce the benefits offered
by political jobs in the private sector. One effect of term limits is to
increase the supply of people looking for such jobs. More people will
have held legislative offices, and many of those who are defeated when
they seek to move along the political opportunity structure will remain
in politics as lobbyists or the like. Studies of the post-congressional
careers of members of the 'House of Representatives indicate that a
substantial number of former representatives continue to be involved
in politics. A survey of representatives who retired between 1971 and
1992 reveals that twenty-one percent worked as lawyers, lobbyists, or
representatives of interest groups; twenty percent left Congress for
other government positions; and forty-eight percent worked as volun-
teers for political causes and candidates. 95 Former representatives
were more likely to decide to remain employed in politics if they had
been forced out of elected office,96 a situation that will occur with
increasing frequency under term limits.
Perhaps the supply of politically-related private sector and ap-
pointed jobs will increase and absorb the additional supply of quali-
fied politicians. 97 But, the greater quantity of jobs reduces their
desirability. Scarcity creates part of the mystique and influence that
surrounds these jobs-the more former senators traipsing around
Capitol Hill and the more appointed political positions created for
defeated politicians, the less the prestige and power associated with
each one. Certainly, broader dissemination of power may not com-
pletely eliminate the desirability of such employment. After all, plenty
of people still sought seats in the House after reforms strengthened
the committee system in the 1970s and 1980s by decentralizing power
and reducing the prestige associated with individual offices and com-
95 Rebekah Herrick & David L. Nixon, Is There Life After Congress?: Patterns and Determi-
nants of Post-Congressional CareersJ. LEGIS. STUD. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18 tbl. 2, on
file with the Cornell Law Review).
96 Id. at 10-11.
97 See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 4, at 514-17 (discussing various ways that the post-
legislative career option set may expand to meet increased demand and to allow special
interests to continue to exercise control over lawmakers); see also infra text accompanying
notes 211-12 (discussing the likelihood that such jobs would develop after the imposition
of term limits). But see Herrick & Nixon, supra note 95, at 12 (providing survey results
indicating that the retirement surge of the 1970s increased the supply of former politicians
seeking employment in lobbying jobs and finding that the rate of interest group employ-
ment was depressed relative to other periods).
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mittee positions.98 But the greater number of such politically-related
jobs will certainly decrease their prestige and the compensation they
offer.
Thus, assuming that there are no dynamic changes in the nature
of political offices, the effect of term limits on Bw, is most likely insub-
stantial. Certainly, the term of office will be shortened and therefore
the holder can enjoy benefits for less time. But term limits will also
shorten the wait for a leadership position, perhaps compensating for
the downward pressure on the value of Bw. Term limits will not affect
the ability to use an office as a springboard, but future options may be
somewhat less attractive than similar jobs are now. On the other
hand, offices that act as springboards to a variety ofjobs or to the most
desirable jobs may be more valuable after term limits as politicians are
forced to move more frequently among elected and nonelected or
public and private political jobs.
Term limits will not change the final factor in the calculation-
the benefits of the employment available to the unsuccessful aspirant
(BL). Without term limits, a politician weighing the decision whether
to run for reelection or to seek a higher office must consider the op-
tions available to her if she chooses to run but loses. She will also
consider the benefit of these activities when she decides whether to
retire from politics entirely rather than run for any office at all.99 The
benefit of alternative employment remains the same under term lim-
its. First, if the alternative occupation is more attractive to the politi-
cian than running for office, that is, if U< BL, then presumably she will
choose not to run. Second, she may believe that running for higher
office will provide her contacts and experience that will increase or
improve her opportunities outside elected office, regardless of
whether or not she wins.
In sum, the effects of term limits on the ambitious politician who
is planning a strategy for her career are complex, and perhaps not as
significant as one might first presume. In the next section, I broaden
the perspective and discuss the ramifications for the overall composi-
tion of Congress.
98 Lawrence C. Dodd, Congress and the Quest for Power in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 272
(1st ed. 1977) (noting that the committee system "denies every member the opportunity to
control all policy decisions, [but] it ensures that most members.., can satisfy a portion of
their power drive"); ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 58 (1983) (explain-
ing that reforms to strengthen committees were designed to ensure that all individual
members, especiallyjunior ones, had some power, but the aggregate effect was to disperse
power generally throughout the body).
99 See Kiewiet & Zeng, supra note 43, at 928 (estimating the effects of relevant variables
on the decision whether to retire, run for reelection, or seek higher office). Included in
this calculus is the decision to forego greater pension benefits in some cases and a consid-
eration of the pleasures of leisure that can be enjoyed in retirement. See Schansberg, supra
note 53, at 449.
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D. Progressive Ambition as the Dominant; but Not Universal,
Characteristic of Politicians After the Adoption of
Term Limits
In the end, the fact that term limits eliminate the possibility of
remaining in one job indefinitely, coupled with the pyramidal struc-
ture of political opportunities, no doubt reduces the probability of a
long career in elected office. Nevertheless, even with term limitations,
the House and Senate will still consist primarily of the professional
politicians so denigrated by activists. 100 First, the previous analysis has
undermined supporters' argument that ambitious people will no
longer consider a career in politics and will instead pursue other ca-
reers. Term limits will increase the probability of winning an elected
office, providing many candidates with an incentive to embark on
political careers, even though such careers can no longer be sustained
by static ambition. Even if a candidate loses, she may not be forced
out of politics entirely. For example, in a state without term limits for
state officials, a candidate can wait in the state legislature until a run
for higher office appears to be a good bet. A politician can spend part
of her career in an appointed position or a private-sector political job.
In all of these circumstances, an individual pursuing this strategy is
most accurately characterized as a career politician-not a citizen-
legislator.
Certainly, politicians with discrete ambition may be more numer-
ous after the adoption of term limits. But the number of these legisla-
tors will be small compared to the number of professionals, and
certainly not significant enough to transform Congress into the do-
main of ordinary citizens. The number of discretely-ambitious per-
sons will increase primarily because the dynamic changes caused by
term limits will make the offices more attractive to them. For exam-
ple, if the adoption of term limits weakens the seniority system,101 per-
sons who want to serve for a very limited time period can realistically
aspire to positions of power and influence during their few years of
public service. The rhetoric lauding the "citizen-legislator" may en-
courage them to believe that their constituents will hold them in high
100 John M. Carey studied the effect of term limitations on careerism in the Costa
Rican Assembly and found that although they eliminated the prospect of careers in the
national assembly, they did not operate to eliminate the professional politician from the
legislature. Instead, most legislators had served in political posts prior to being elected to
the Assembly, and a significant majority served in appointed political jobs after their legis-
lative terms. See CAREY, supra note 5, at 71-72, 80-85, 256-57. Whether the Costa Rican
experience can be generalized to this country is questionable; the party structure in the
two countries is vastly different, as is the relationship between the legislative and executive
branches. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that term limitations do not automatically
deter professional politicians from seeking office.
101 See infra part IVA
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esteem, allowing -them more- influence in shaping national priorities.
Nonetheless, citizen-legislators will remain a minority in Congress be-
cause it is unlikely that amateurs will often succeed in campaigns
against professionals whose brand names, though diminished, will still
give them an advantage. Moreover, compared to citizen-legislators,
careerists have greater incentives to invest in fund-raising, and special
interest groups have greater incentives to invest in careerists, because
the return on such investments will be greater.
Although they will not predominate after term limits, it is true
that more discretely-ambitious politicians will serve in the legislature
because more will be attracted to running. But discrete ambition will,
in many cases, develop into progressive ambition, and as a result,
many amateur politicians will become careerists. For a political nov-
ice, the investment required to attain and hold political office will
make a political career more enticing when she reaches the point at
which she had planned to retire. That is, once a politician has in-
vested in the human capital required to perform political functions,
she will find that the benefits of holding similar offices are greater
than the benefits of pursuing an unrelated career. Because of the na-
ture of the political market, politicians who have invested in develop-
ing political skills and political brand names cannot receive a full
return on their investments unless they remain in political office.' 0 2 A
politician may enter politics for one set of reasons, but she will decide
to remain in politics for entirely different reasons.
Professor Black makes this point in a different way. He notes that
"each investment that the individual makes in the political process in
his political unit is an investment not only in the office he seeks or
holds but also potentially in the other offices or positions eventually open to the
individual."0 3 Black sees the ability to transfer political investment
from one office to another as one factor that decreases the costs of
seeking election, and he notes that the greater the individual's invest-
ment, the higher the value she places on political offices to which she
may aspire. 10 4 If political ambition adapts to fit changing expecta-
tions, many who begin public service as citizen-legislators will end as
careerists. The adoption of term limits will not, therefore, mark the
renaissance of the citizen-legislator.
102 See Lott, Brand Names, supra note 66, at 87; Lott, Nontransferable Property, supra note
66, at 231; see also supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing political brand names in the
context of increased challenges to incumbents).
103 Black, supra note 40, at 155.
104 Id. at 156. Once a politician begins to make political investments, she is more likely
to run for office in the future, even if she entered public life with no intention of seeking
higher office. The transferability of her investment in politics increases the return re-
ceived from a political job, particularly when compared to the expected return from
nonpolitical occupations, which remains constant. Id. at 158-59.
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IV
THE DYNAMIc EFFECTS OF TERM LIMITATIONS ON THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The crucial question that remains for term limits supporters is
whether term limits will work significant changes in the nature of leg-
islative offices themselves. If they will, either the type of person who
contemplates a career in politics will be very different or a person will
behave differently once in office.10 5 Such changes may provide ajusti-
fication for term limits that does not rest on the conclusion that they
produce a citizen-legislature; rather, the argument is that term limits
are warranted because they encourage those holding public office to
act in ways more consistent with the public's notion of a dedicated
public servant.
My assumption in the previous discussion-that the nature of
elected office will not fundamentally change after passage of a term
limits amendment-is clearly unrealistic. Notwithstanding the crucial
role of a dynamic analysis in an accurate assessment of term limita-
tions, few discussions of such complex changes appear in the term
limits literature. 06 These changes are important to anticipate for at
least two reasons. First, a profound change in the nature of the office
will affect the value of the benefits it offers, which is one of the princi-
pal terms in the calculation used by prospective candidates in deter-
mining whether to run for office and whether politics will be a viable,
105 I do not address in this article whether changes in the nature of the legislative job
will result in a different sort of person pursuing elected office on the federal level, or
whether the changes will transform the preferences of those already in politics so that they
will be content receiving different benefits from elected office. These effects are not mutu-
ally exclusive; both may result from a change in the nature of the legislative office. The
analysis in this article is not affected, however, by which one occurs or dominates. In either
case, the legislator will behave differently than she does now and thus may begin to pursue
public interest, as term limits supporters define it.
106 Indeed, one limitation in the recent term limits literature is that many studies as-
sume that endogenous characteristics of the political process will survive unchanged. For
example, Professors Reed and Schansberg assume that after term limits the seniority sys-
tem will remain intact and that the continuation rates for members will not change. Reed
& Schansberg, The House, supra note 5, at 735-36 (defending the use of historical continua-
tion rates in their study); id. at 702-03, 708 (noting effect on conclusions if leadership
positions were filled using criteria other than seniority). However, Reed and Schansberg
recognize the problem:
By this assumption [of unchanged continuation rates under term limits] we
do not mean to imply that the behavior of politicians and voters will be
unaffected by term limits. The problem is, we don't know how term limits
would affect continuation rates.... Given this ambivalence, our assumption
that continuation rates will remain the same once term limits become bind-
ing may be thought of as representing a first approximatior.
Id. at 705. Until we have sufficient experience with term limits in state legislatures, empiri-
cal studies will continue to rely on measures of congressional behavior that term limita-
tions will undoubtedly affect.
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long-term career.10 7 But whether term limits will actually bring about
such a profound change is unclear. As long as the relevant parties in
the legislative process-representatives, senators, and interest
groups-wish to preserve the benefits of the status quo, they will
adopt rules and reshape political institutions to serve their purposes.
As Professor Katz and Sala have found, "Congressional organizations
are a matter of choice for incumbent members of Congress; they tend
to reflect the forces that drive members' interests and incentives."108
If the political scene can be reconfigured to offset the changes in the
nature of legislative office caused by shorter tenure, then the adop-
tion of term limits may have very little effect on Congress.
Second, if term limits do not change the ratio of amateurs to ca-
reerists in Congress, then Americans who support the reform are
likely to be disappointed unless they are convinced that term limits
will alter the way professional politicians act. As I have noted, it is
difficult to discern exactly what change in legislative behavior will sat-
isfy the concerns of most term limits activists.' 0 9 Certainly, business as
usual is not acceptable. If supporters can be persuaded that, although
the elimination of careerists from politics is unlikely, term limits will
almost certainly change legislative behavior, they can then determine
whether those changes justify embarking on the arduous task of
amending the Constitution. Alternatively, supporters can assess
whether a system comprised of careerists who have held a variety of
political jobs-at different levels of government, in different
branches, and in the private sphere-is preferable to one that is domi-
nated by careerists who remain in the legislature for years and even
decades. Finally, if future analysis of the effects of term limits suggests
that no change in legislative behavior will necessarily result, term lim-
its supporters can work to find and implement other solutions to the
problems they perceive in the political process.
In the remainder of this Article, I offer some thoughts about a
few of the dynamic changes that will accompany the adoption of term
limits, and I assess how those changes may alter the nature of the con-
gressional office. My objective in this article is only to identify the
kind of politician one would expect to find in Congress after the ratifi-
107 See supra text accompanying note 58.
108 Jonathan N. Katz & Brian R. Sala, Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral
Connection, 90 Am. POLE Sci. REv. 21, 30 (1996) (studying the committee system following
changes in state ballot access laws). On the state level, some observers of term limits in
California believe that the influx of freshman has not meaningfully changed legislative
behavior. See Elaine Korry, History of Legislative Reform in California, Part 2 (National Public
Radio, Morning Edition, Dec. 8, 1995) (transcript on file with the Core Law Review) (In-
terview with Bruce Cain, Institute for Governmental Studies: "[Term limits have] brought
in new faces. The problem is that if you had hoped that new faces meant necessarily new
practices, then you're going to be disappointed.").
109 See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
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cation of a term limits amendment. I do not argue that term limits
are or are notjustified because of their effects on the quality of delib-
eration, legislative output, or the political process generally. With a
greater understanding of these dynamic changes, however, people
may choose to support or oppose term limitations solely because of
changes in these areas and no longer engage in the traditional citizen-
legislators-versus-professionals debate.
At the outset, we need to identify the benefits currently offered by
federal legislative offices; these provide the incentive to seek political
office and retain it for decades. Surprisingly, most studies of congres-
sional behavior do not analyze the specific objectives that motivate
lawmakers. Instead, much of the literature analyzing congressional
behavior assumes that legislators are single-minded pursuers of reelec-
tion." 0 As long as politicians can be reelected indefinitely, congres-
sional behavior can be adequately explained by the desire to remain
in office because a politician must be reelected before she can achieve
her other goals, whatever they may be."' As David Mayhew ex-
plained, "[T]he electoral goal has an attractive universality to it. It has
to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved
over and over if other ends are to be entertained."1 2 Thus, the "pref-
erence for reelection" is a useful shorthand term because, in the cur-
rent political system, no goal can be achieved unless the reelection
preference is satisfied. 15
Term limitations significantly diminish the explanatory power of
the reelection preference. Term limits eliminate the possibility of an
110 See, e.g., BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTrTUENCY SERVICE AND ELEC-
TORAL INDEPENDENCE 77 (1987) (asserting that members hope to profit electorally from
their activities); FIORINA, supra note 66, at 37 ("I assume that the primary goal of the typical
congressman is reelection."); MAYHEW, supra note 69, at 13 ("The discussion will come to
hinge on the assumption that United States congressmen are interested in getting re-
elected-indeed, in their role here as abstractions, interested in nothing else."). Other
studies include reelection as one of several motivations. See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, JR.,
CONGRESSMEN IN COMMrrrEES 1 (1973) (stating that the goals espoused by representatives
are "re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy," as well as a career
beyond the House and perhaps private gain); DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN
THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 40 (1991) (same); cf Steven S. Smith & ChristopherJ. Deering,
Changing Motives for Committee Preferences of New Members of the U.S. House, 8 LEGIs. STUD. Q.
271 (1983) (noting that most legislators have mixed motives).
111 See DowNs, supra note 14, at 30.
112 MAYHEW, supra note 69, at 16; see also MAASS, supra note 98, at 71 ("[Reelection] is a
goal to be achieved, or 'satisfied'-a constraint that must be met if the member's career is
to continue. Once it is achieved, however, the member can and does pursue other
goals.").
113 But cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SOCIAL NoRMs AND SOCIAL ROLES (Chicago Law & Eco-
nomics Working Paper No. 36, 1995) (noting that "for many purposes, the whole idea of 'a
preference' is confused and misleading, because it is ambiguous between choices and un-
derlying psychological forces, and because the mental operations that produce choices are
a function of a great many factors").
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indefinite number of chances for reelection; thus, an analysis of their
effects must take account of the variety of motivations that explain the
behavior of politicians. Although this list is not exhaustive, I contend
that lawmakers are motivated by three main goals: wielding power
and exercising influence because of the status associated with being a
powerful person; achieving certain policy objectives that the lawmaker
values; and enjoying monetary and in-kind benefits offered by special
interests." 4 These goals are not entirely distinct in all cases. For ex-
ample, a legislator may value power and influence only as tools to help
her implement policy objectives. But she may be powerful and still
choose not to institute new policies. Instead, the lawmaker may try to
influence the results of decisions within existing policy structures, or
she may be relatively indifferent to the content of the enacted policy,
caring only that she be portrayed as the force behind the change.
Similarly, special interests tend to target lawmakers with substantial
power and prestige. However, a lawmaker may seek only narrow influ-
ence over one aspect of government policy to attract "rents" from in-
terest groups in that sector" 5 without seeking influence and national
attention more generally. Or a politician may be interested in the
114 Compensation may also be a factor motivating people to consider running for Con-
gress, and its absence from the list does not suggest that changes in congressional pay play
no role in the decision. For example, almost one-third of the members who retired from
the 102nd Congress did so because 1992 was the last time retiring House members could
convert unspent campaign funds to personal use. Groseclose & Krehbiel, supra note 58, at
89, 91 tbl. 2 (suggesting that change in real wage is a statistically significant factor in the
decision by representatives to retire); JOHN R. HIBBING, CHOOSING To LEAVE: VOLUNTARY
REnREMENT FROM THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATWiES 39-42 (1982) (finding that a salary
increase lowers the number of retirements). Some researchers, however, doubt whether
one can meaningfully study the effect of pay because of the wide differences in legislators'
opportunity costs. See Kiewiet & Zeng, supra note 48, at 931. Nevertheless, although con-
gressional pay is certainly a factor in the prospective candidate's decision, term limits will
not affect the level of pay; rather, they will only shorten the period during which politicians
receive compensation. When out of office, a politician will receive a salary, health insur-
ance, and retirement benefits from private employment, and these may be greater than
similar congressional benefits. Many of the perquisites associated with legislative service-
access to a health club, subsidized haircuts, and free parking at National Airport-have
recently been eliminated or pared back. And one of the frequent targets for criticism
during this period of budget cutbacks is the congressional pension system, so this form of
compensation may decline whether or not term limits pass. See Richard E. Cohen, Putting a
Lid on Members'Pensions, NAT'LJ., Feb. 10, 1996, at 320; Jeff Shear, The Other Entitlement,
NAT'LJ., Oct. 14, 1995, at 2532; see also Hall & van Houweling, supra note 44, at 128-29
(finding that changes in present value of pensions affect members' decisions to stay in
office or to retire). The unique aspects of congressional remuneration-benefits from
interest groups, free use of a television recording studio to court national fame, and the
possibility of lucrative post-term employment in lobbying-are closely tied to the goals of
achieving power and prestige and attracting attention from interest groups. A discussion
of their relationship to term limits is most relevant in that context. See infra part IV. C.
115 "Rent seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for the
use of an economic asset in excess of market price) through government intervention in
the market." Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory In-
terpretation: An Interest Group Mode, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 224 n.6 (1986).
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status of being a powerful and important person without particularly
caring whether she also receives lavish perquisites from lobbyists. In
the remainder of this Article, I will explore the ways in which term
limits affect the ability of lawmakers to satisfy these objectives.
A. Attaining Power and Influence in a Legislature Without a
Strong Seniority System
As Congress became the domain of professional politicians, mem-
bers attempted to imbue the institution with "structural" certainty as
they planned careers in an arena with an inherent element of uncer-
tainty-the threat of defeat. One such structure is the seniority sys-
tem, which serves as the primary method used to fill congressional
positions. Use of the seniority system became common in the House
as early as 1910, and it was entrenched by the middle of this cen-
tury.he No longer were members at the mercy of congressional lead-
ers for the allocation of positions on prestigious committees or the
appointment of party positions; instead, the seniority system regular-
ized advancement in the body, removing most of the leaders' discre-
tion. In addition, seniority allowed party leaders to reduce the
possibility of disruptive intraparty conflicts over appointments. Not
surprisingly, the seniority system reinforced the tendency toward long-
term careers by tying power to tenure." 7
Although weakened over the course of the last twenty years, sen-
iority remains the over-riding consideration in the appointment of
committees and congressional leaders. Sweeping institutional re-
forms in the House in the 1970s allowed the Democratic caucus to
reject by secret-ballot vote the most senior member of a committee for
the position of chairman and provided that the demand of only ten
members of the caucus could trigger such a vote." 8 Taking advantage
of the new rules, the Democratic freshmen in 1974 interviewed likely
committee chairmen about their planned legislative agendas and, af-
ter a caucus vote, removed three incumbents." 9 Although this revolt
of the freshmen is significant, it did not mark the death of the senior-
116 See Polsby, Institutionalization, supra note 56, at 161 fig. 5 (tracing the relative
strength of the seniority system over time by measuring deviations from seniority in the
appointment of committee chairmen).
117 See Price, supra note 16, at 17-20; Polsby, Institutionalization, supra note 56.
118 ROHDE, supra note 110, at 11, 23. Prior to this change, committee chairmen were
selected largely on the basis of seniority. Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The
House in Transition, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 98, at 21, 27-28.
119 W.R. Poage of the Agriculture Committee, F. Edward Hebert of the Armed Services
Committee, and Wright Patman of the Banking Committee were denied reelection. In
addition, Wilbur Mills of the Ways and Means Committee resigned before the caucus could
vote to remove him. ROHDE, supra note 110, at 22-23; Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Changing
Textbook Congress, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GovERN? 254-55 (John E. Chubb & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1989).
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ity system. In the next Congress, the Democrats in the House faith-
fully followed seniority.120 Recent experience in the House
demonstrates that seniority remains the norm, although the system
shows signs of strain. In 1990, two incumbent chairmen were ousted,
but they were replaced by very senior members of the committees. 121
The situation in 1992 was more typical; only Jamie Whitten was re-
moved from his chairmanship and only because of his failing
health.122 Speaker Gingrich did not follow seniority in three appoint-
ments of committee chairmen in 1994, and, in one case, he bypassed
four senior members and appointed Robert Livingston to head the
Appropriations Committee. 23
The Senate follows the seniority norm rigorously, allowing more
senior senators to bump incumbent chairmen from their positions
when such posts become more attractive because of changes in the
legislative agenda or for other reasons. 124 In 1986, Jesse Helms, who
had chaired the Agriculture Committee, decided to serve as the rank-
ing member on the Foreign Relations committee, a post that would
otherwise have gone to the former Chairman Richard Lugar.125 In
the ensuing contest for the position, even moderate and liberal
Republicans who preferred Lugar's ideological positions bowed to the
seniority principle and supported Senator Helms. 126 Senate Demo-
crats are slightly more flexible regarding the seniority norm in select-
ing members for committees; they will consider other criteria such as
geography. 127 Nevertheless, seniority remains the primary factor. In
part because of the increasing importance of health care issues, Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy stepped down from the chairmanship of the Ju-
diciary Committee and chose to lead the Labor and Human
120 HIBBING, supra note 114, at tbl. 1-3.
121 CONG. Q., INC., 1991 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 5 (1991). Glenn Anderson, the chairman
of the House Committee on Public Works, was replaced by the next most senior member
of the committee, Robert Roe; Frank Annunzio, Chairman of the House Administration
Committee, was ousted by Charlie Rose, who ranked third in seniority. More ominously
for chairmen, eleven received more than 20 votes opposing their reelection. Two years
before, no opposing votes had been cast. Id.
122 CONG. Q. INC., 1993 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 4 (1993).
123 David L. Haase, Indiana Clout Up and Out, IrDuiAious NEws, Feb. 25, 1995, at El;
Helen Dewar, Senate GOP Leaders Block Vote on Ousting Chairman Hawld, WASH. POST, Mar.
9, 1995, atA7; see alsoJackie Koszczuk, Freshmen: New, Powerful Voice 53 CONG. Q. 3251, 3251
(Oct. 28, 1995). Gingrich's other assignments that were inconsistent with seniority were
the appointment of Thomas Bliley as chairman of the Commerce Committee and the ap-
pointment of Henry Hyde to lead the Judiciary Committee.
124 STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHERJ. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 71 (2d ed.
1990); CONG. Q. INC., GUIDE TO CONGRESS 461, 469 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter GUIDE TO
CONGRESS]; Craig D. Margolis, House Out of Order, 11 J.L. & POL 273, 334-35 (1995).
125 Norman J. Ornstein et al., The U.S. Senate in an Era of Change, in CONGRESS RECON-
SIDERED, supra note 36, at 32.
126 Id.
127 SMrrH & DEERING, supra note 124 at 71.
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Resources Committee, depriving Howard Metzenbaum of the latter
role. 128 The continuing vitality of the seniority system has been re-
cently demonstrated during negotiations between Republican leaders
and Democratic legislators who were considering switching parties.
One of the most important issues for the wavering Democrats was
whether they could maintain their seniority ranking and assume or
retain positions on prestigious committees whose membership is usu-
ally reserved for more senior members. 29
In general, the presence of a large group of freshmen legislators
tends to loosen the seniority norm because the freshman have suffi-
cient votes in the caucuses to shift power from senior members to
themselves. The election of a substantial number of new members
was a catalyst for the structural reforms of the 1970s, which were
designed to decentralize power and, more specifically, to increase the
power of junior representatives.130 The recent turnover in Congress,
and the resulting entry in 1992 and 1994 of large freshman classes, has
challenged the seniority system.131 Senior members of the Senate Re-
publican caucus narrowly defeated a proposal, offered by a special
task force studying rules changes, that would have allowed the major-
128 See Ornstein et al., supra note 125 at 32.
129 See, e.g., Richard E. Cohen, Payofffor Party Switchers, NAT'LJ., Mar. 23, 1996, at 660
(noting that ex-Democrats have been given prestigious committee assignments by House
Republican leadership); Campbell Citing BBA Defeat, Switches to Republicans, CONG. DAILY,
Mar. 3, 1995 (reporting that Republicans agreed to preserve Senator Campbell's seniority
after his switch to their party); Helen Dewar, Republicans Prepare for Their Turn on the Hil"
Shelby Defects, Boosting GOP's Senate Strength, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 1994, at A27 (Sen. Shelby
retained his seniority, even though other Republicans were demoted a rank in seniority.).
See also Michael deCourcy Hinds, Senator Who Wouldn't Run Has Won, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
1992, at A9 (Sen. Conrad, who did not run for reelection but ran for a seat vacated by
Quentin Burdick's death, was allowed to retain his seniority rank.). House members who
have switched parties also negotiate to preserve their seniority. See, e.g.,Juliana Gruenwald,
Tauzin Makes It Officia" He's Now A Republican, 53 CONG. Q. 2458 (Aug. 12, 1995) (Rep.
Tauzin negotiated to retain his seniority rank and his seat on the House Commerce Coin-
mittee.). Majority Leader Robert Dole relied on the strong seniority norm in ensuring, that
one of his opponents for the Republican presidential nomination was denied a position on
the Finance Committee at the beginning of the 104th Congress. Although Phil Gramm
coveted a seat on the powerful Senate committee, Dole was able to persuade other more
senior senators to request the open seats. The resignation of Bob Packwood finally allowed
Gramm to move to the tax-writing committee because Dole could not find a senator more
senior willing to move to the Finance Committee. Jackie Koszczuk & David S. Cloud,- Dole
Search Fails: Gramm Going to Finance Panel 53 CONG. Q. 2967 (Sept. 30, 1995).
130 Dodd & Oppenheimer, supra note 118, at.23; MASS, supra note 98, at 56. See also
NormanJ. Ornstein, Causes and Consequences of Congressional Change: Subcommittee Reforms in
the House of Representatives, 1970-73, in CONGRESS IN CHANGE, supra note 16, at 88, 89 ("Thus
structural reform in Congress is generally a product of those who feel shortchanged of
power.").
131 See Koszczuk, supra note 123, at 3251 (discussing the influence of the House fresh-
man class on policy);Jason DeParle, Rant/Listen, Exploit/Learn, Scare/Help, Manipulate/Lead,
N.Y. TIMES MAG.,Jan. 28, 1996, at 34 (detailing difficulties Gingrich has had with the large
and aggressive freshman class).
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ity leader, rather than the members of each committee, to select com-
mittee chairmen. 132 Although the leader's selection of a chairman
was to be based largely on seniority, the task force envisioned a leader
responsive to other concerns as well.133 The caucus did change the
method of selecting chairmen: committee members now vote by se-
cret ballot,'3 4 presumably allowing for less politically costly, and there-
fore more frequent, deviations from the norm of seniority. The
House Republicans limited the speaker to four consecutive two-year
terms 35 and committee chairmen to three consecutive two-year
terms, ended proxy voting and rolling quorums (practices that in-
crease the power of chairmen to control outcomes in committee), and
made several appointments that were inconsistent with seniority.1 36
The ratification of a term limits amendment will place even
greater pressure on the seniority system. Term limits necessarily elim-
inate the possibility of long tenure in one house. It would be astonish-
ing if the seniority system can survive such a change without
substantial revision, perhaps so substantial as to destroy its status as a
norm. The extent of the turnover that term limitations will cause in
the House of Representatives has been estimated by Professors. Reed
and Schansberg. 37 They predict that a twelve-year term limit will in-
crease the average turnover rate from seventeen percent to twenty-
three percent. This change is not as dramatic as the increase in the
turnover rate if representatives were limited to six years (resulting in a
thirty-seven percent turnover rate), but it is at the high end of the
range for turnover rates since the 1950s. It is also slightly higher than
the significant shift in 1994 when twenty-one percent of the House
members were freshmen.
More importantly, turnover caused by term limits will be different
from even the relatively high turnover of the last few elections. First,
turnover under term limits will not be a smooth process; instead, the
House will experience periodic spikes in membership turnover as one
class of representatives reaches the term limit and leaves office. (In-
terestingly, had the Court in U.S. Term Limits upheld state-imposed
tem limits, such spikes would have been avoided as the state provi-
sions took effect in different years.) Thus, under a twelve-year term
132 David S. Cloud, GOP Senators Limit Chairmen to Six Years Heading Pane4 53 CONG. Q.
2147, 2147 (July 22, 1995).
133 d.
134- See id.
135' Id.
136 Jackie Koszczuk, Gingrich Puts More Power Into Speaker's Hands, 53 CONG. Q. 3049,
3053 (Oct. 7, 1995). Senate Republicans also adopted term limits for chairmen and lim-
ited the ability of committee chairmen to chair other committees or subcommittees. Rich-
ard E.'Cohen, A Six-Year Rule for Chairmen, NAT'LJ., May 18, 1996, at 1087.
137 Reed & Schansberg, The House, supra note 5, at 708-11.
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limit, forty percent of the House will consist of freshmen at the end of
the first twelve years; another, somewhat smaller "superclass" will be
elected at the end of the next twelve years; and the spikes will con-
tinue to occur every twelve years thereafter, although they will de-
crease in magnitude. 138 Second, the members forced to leave office
are invariably the most senior. This change is a noteworthy contrast to
recent, relatively volatile Houses. For example, in 1992, thirty-nine
percent of those who left had served less than twelve years, and in
1994, forty-six percent had served less than six terms.139
The certain prospect of large freshmen classes at regular intervals
will challenge the seniority system; indeed, supporters of term limits
probably intend for provisions to eviscerate the seniority system, or, as
they see it, "the mechanism by which entrenched and out-of-touch
members perpetuate their power."'140 Pressure on the seniority system
will come from two sources. First, the freshmen will likely favor a sys-
tem that decreases the power of more senior members and allows jun-
ior members to exert greater influence. The freshman can meet
before the session begins, plan a strategy, and, given their numbers,
command enough votes to implement changes in the system.141 Sec-
ond, even in the absence of a revolt, seniority will no longer be as
effective a means of differentiation among members because every
member serves for a relatively short time and large entering classes
share the same seniority rank. At the least, seniority will have to be
138 See id. Reed and Schansberg's findings are subject to some criticism. They rely on
historical continuation rates, which almost certainly will be affected by term limitations,
and they assume that the seniority system will continue unchanged after the ratification of
the amendment. SeeJay P. Greene, Term Limits: A Measure of Our IgnorancA 76 Soc. Sci. Q.
717, 717-18 (1995) (disputing use of historic continuation rates on the ground that term
limits will destroy expectations of a long-term political career and attacking assumptions as
to the continuation of the seniority system); Everett Upshaw, An Economist's View of Research
on Term Limits, 76 Soc. Scr. Q. 730, 731-32 (1995) (also discussing the use of historic con-
tinuation rates). Others have refined the notion of freshman superclasses, arguing that "to
the extent that term limits make incumbents more vulnerable prior to when the term
limits become binding, the smaller will be this initial 'superclass' and the faster we will see
legislative refinements converging to their long term steady-state." Daniel & Lott, supra
note 62, at 1. Nevertheless, Reed and Schansberg's conclusions that Congress will include
more freshmen legislators and that spikes in turnover will occur, but with decreasing
strength, are indisputable. After all, term limitations force turnover of the most senior
members of the legislature at regular periods. As other causes of attrition begin to stagger
the time at which the period begins to run for each particular office, the spikes will lessen.
139 Derived from data from BARONE & UJIFSA, supra note 38.
140 Copeland, supra note 20, at 27; see also Paul Jacob, Whose Government Is It, Anyway ,
No UNCERTAIN TERMs, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 4 (noting that "[s] trict term limits will end the
seniority system"); WILL, supra note 7, at 91.
141 See, e.g., New House Members Arrive on Capitol Hill, S.F. CHRoN., Dec. 2, 1992, at A3
(describing similar seminars held by freshman members of Congress in 1992). But see
Elhauge, supra note 4, at 27-28 (arguing that junior legislators will not necessarily favor
eliminating all seniority advantages because such advantages improve their odds of reelec-
tion over challengers with no seniority at all).
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supplemented by additional criteria to select among lawmakers who
are members of the same entering class.
What system of selecting committee members and party leaders
will replace the seniority system? And how will the new system affect
the value of a congressional seat? Term limits advocates are con-
vinced that merit will replace longevity.142 "Merit" is a difficult term
to define in any way that receives universal acceptance, however. Does
merit mean that the legislator faithfully represents the views of her
constituents as they are revealed through focus groups and opinions
polls? Or is legislative behavior more meritorious when the lawmaker
facilitates the deliberation of major issues in an attempt to shape pub-
lic opinion or, failing that, votes as she thinks informed constituents
would prefer? Is merit tied to support for certain political programs
or fidelity to party positions? How can congressional leaders judge
the merit ofjunior members of Congress who may have no prior polit-
ical experience at the federal, state, or local level? Is the idea of merit
so subjective that it can justify decisions made on virtually any basis,
thereby eliminating the possibility that political careers will follow
consistent patterns? An analysis of congressional practice before the
rise of the seniority norm and of non-professional state legislatures
may provide some answers.
Before the seniority system emerged in Congress, committee as-
signments and leadership selections turned on purely political consid-
erations. In the House, the Speaker parceled out chairmanships of
prestigious committees to those who had supported his election and
brought with them large voting blocs. 143 The Speaker used his discre-
tion in appointments to ensure passage of his legislative agenda and
to shore up his political support.14 Although in the modern Con-
gress the Speaker and other congressional leaders share the appoint-
ment power with their caucuses;145 after term limits, the strongest
coalition can similarly use the malleable standard of "merit" to place
supporters in key congressional positions. Prospective party leaders
can indicate, during their campaigns for office, whom they prefer as
their "Cabinet" of key leaders. Such political processes will be very
different from the operation of the seniority system in the 104th Con-
142 See, e.g., F. Paul Calamita, Solving the Voters' Dilemma: The Case for Legislative Term-
Limitation, 8J. oF L. & POE. 559 (1992).
143 Polsby, Institutionalization, supra note 56, at 156. See Price, supra note 16, at 15 ("So
long as the Speaker made all appointments, both of members and committee chairmen,
candidates within the majority party campaigned for the speakership nomination largely in
terms of promises to make, or maintain, such appointments.").
144 Polsby, Institutionalization, supra note 56, at 157.
145 See supra text at notes 118-20.
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gress when moderates assumed chairmanships of key committees even
though the Republican leadership's agenda was conservative. 146
The selection processes used in state legislatures with high turno-
ver rates also tend to rely on the discretion of the party leaders and on
political coalitions. Peverill Squire has studied state legislatures and
divided them into three types: career, springboard, and dead-end. 147
Consistent with the explanation for the growth of the seniority system
in the federal legislature, he finds that seniority is prevalent in state
legislatures where members perceive service as a career and where
there is relatively little turnover.1 48 In springboard and dead-end leg-
islatures, the turnover rates are so high that seniority is not a useful
norm, and appointments depend on political skill and party sup-
port.149 Anecdotal evidence from the California State Assembly-a
springboard legislature before term limits-indicates that term limits
have created even more chaos in the selection of legislative leaders,
particularly as members nearing the end of their allotted service fight
to gain influential posts.150
If the seniority system in Congress is replaced by a system that
rewards political alliances and abilities, it will affect the career strate-
gies of professional politicians. No longer will there be a predictable
path to power and influence in the body; holding prestigious posi-
tions will depend on political skill and, perhaps, on the whim of the
congressional leadership. This alteration in the political landscape
may well make the office of representative or senator more valuable
for the progressively-ambitious politician who seeks national attention
and wants to make a mark early in her career. If a politician is suffi-
ciently skillful, she may assume the helm of a prestigious committee
much earlier than she can now. Indeed, in state legislatures that are
not organized around strong seniority norms, many junior members'
serve on powerful and important committees, and, conversely, chair-
men and leaders tend not to be the most senior members of the
146 CONG. Q. INC., 1995 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 17 (1995).
147 Peverill Squire, Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legisla-
tures, 50J. OF POL. 726 (1988). Squire's study predates the term limits movement, so his
classification of state legislatures may no longer be accurate.
148 Id. at 732-33.
149 Id. The career legislature that Squire studies most closely is New York's where-the
dispersion of seniority was similar to the dispersion in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Id. at 731, 733-34. He also studies the California springboard legislature and the Connecti-
cut dead-end legislature. In both of the latter bodies, seniority was not a significant factor
in appointments to prestigious committees and important leadership roles. Id. at 734-38.
See also Copeland, supra note 55, at 152 (noting that appointments in the Oklahoma legisla-
ture, classified by Squire as dead-end, are controlled by party leaders and do not rely on
seniority). 1
150 B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Recipe for Legislative Chaos: Term Limits, Party Loyalty and
Power, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 1, 1995, at A8.
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body.151 Skillful politicians will not only achieve influential posts
more quickly, they will also use those offices to increase their national
stature early in their careers and thereby increase their chances of
holding other elected offices in the future.
If members of Congress value certainty more than the possibility
of early advancement, however, they can construct institutional struc-
tures to bring stability to the process. For example, seniority rankings
in the Senate currently give credit for prior service in the House. 152
Under term limits, legislators can adopt a seniority system that consid-
ers past political service at all levels of government, thereby regular-
izing the process and decreasing leaders' discretion. This
accommodation will also ensure that congressional leaders are the
members who are the most experienced at governing.
Much as the current system encourages statically-ambitious per-
sons, this type of modified seniority system will reward progressively-
ambitious legislators and thus will reinforce such behavior in politi-
cians. The specifics of the selected system will significantly influence
the shape of the political opportunity structure in the wake of a fed-
eral term limits amendment. Interestingly, if this type of compensat-
ing strategy is chosen, term limits will not make public service more
attractive to discretely-ambitious politicians; just as now, long service
in politics will be a prerequisite of obtaining power and influence.
In conclusion, the ratification of a federal term limitations
amendment may radically change one of the strongest institutional
features of the modem Congress: the seniority system. Seniority may
be replaced by merit as the primary criterion for advancement in the
legislature, allowing the politically precocious to assume leadership
positions early and to retain them with political skill. In this case, the
value of holding a political office will increase, particularly for the pro-
gressively-ambitious person who desires influence in order to play a
high profile role, implement a policy agenda, and increase the
chances for future electoral success. Alternatively, politicians may
modify the seniority system to both accommodate term limits and fa-
cilitate a certain pattern of progressive ambition; just as in the current
system, longevity in politics, rather than merit, will determine the lo-
cus of political power.
15 1 Squire, supra note 147, at 735. In 1981, the California legislature's majority floor
leader had served fewer than two terms, and nine out of twenty-five committee chairs were
just beginning their second term. Id. In Connecticut's legislature, freshmen were well-
represented on those committees that are considered the most influential. Id. at 737.
"The, organization of a body where members have progressive career goals should allow
any member to gain important positions quickly. Power should be decentralized so mem-
bers have the ability to promote their own political fortunes, with junior members being
able to influence legislative decisions." Id. at 728.
152 GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 124, at 475.
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B. The Effect of Term Limitations on Legislator Effectiveness
Many members of Congress pursue power and influence, not as
goals in themselves, but as necessary prerequisites of their primary ob-
jective: implementing a particular policy agenda. To the extent that
the breakdown in the seniority system allows politicians to assume in-
fluential congressional roles sooner, the ability to influence policy-
the second benefit offered by elected office-will be enhanced as well.
But formal office is not sufficient in most cases to effect policy
changes; a legislator must also possess the expertise to develop initia-
tives and to shepherd them though the legislative process. Because
term limitations reduce the time during which legislators can learn
the rules, procedures, and norms of the House or the Senate, they will
decrease the level of legislator effectiveness and thereby affect legisla-
tive output. Although reducing federal legislative activity may be a
goal-albeit often unstated-of term limits supporters, such a change
will alter the desirability of legislative offices and will ultimately
change the type of person attracted to them.
Passing, amending, and opposing legislation are not a lawmaker's
only activities; indeed, they may not even be the primary tasks of a
modem legislator. Unlike other activities such as constituent service
and advertising which should be relatively unaffected by term limits,
however, the lawmaking function may be significantly undermined by
decreased tenure. Constituent service 53 tends to be the most time-
consuming part of holding congressional office, perhaps because the
public's demand for this service is high and members of Congress mo-
nopolize its supply. Research byJohn Hibbing indicates that the level
of constituent-service activity is relatively unchanged over a legislator's
congressional career, particularly with respect to the more recent
classes of representatives.15 4 Thus, term limits may not negatively af-
fect the amount of a lawmaker's casework and project assistance.
153 Richard Fenno defined "constituent service":
Many activities can be incorporated under the rubric of "district service," or
"constituent service," but the core activity is providing help to individuals,
groups, and localities in coping with the federal government. Individuals
need someone to intercede with -the bureaucracies handling their veterans'
benefits, social security checks, military status, civil service pension, immi-
gration proceedings, and the like. Private groups and local governments
need assistance in pursuing federal funds, for water and sewer projects,
highways, dams, buildings, planning, research and development, small busi-
ness loans, and so forth. Sometimes, service benefiting individuals is known
as "casework" and service having a larger number of benefactors is called
"project assistance." Sometimes both are lumped together as casework.
FENNO, supra note 67, at 101.
154 Hibbing, supra note 36, at 77-78. Hibbing used standardized Z-scores to control for
changes in congressional behavior over time and to isolate the changes over a career. See
id. at 77 (describing methodology of Z-scores as a way to control for period changes and to
focus only on life-cycle effects). Junior representatives engage in somewhat greater
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The quality of a legislator's constituent service is also relatively
unaffected by her tenure in Congress. Effective constituent service
techniques are easily taught to new members through seminars, publi-
cations, and political party events. During a campaign, politicians
learn where to find constituents and how to listen and respond to
their problems. Politicians continue to practice and refine this skill
after their election. Staff members, rather than the legislator herself,
perform most constituent work, and seasoned assistants can quickly
establish a routinized process of dealing with correspondence,
casework, and project assistance. Although personal contacts between
legislators and key executive branch officials were once an integral
part of successful constituent service, all agencies and executive de-
partments now have liaisons who ensure that requests from lawmakers
are given high priority and that problems are handled smoothly.155
Because the decline of the seniority system will allow junior members
to reach powerful positions earlier in their careers, they will demand
and receive greater bureaucratic attention to their casework and pro-
ject-assistance efforts. Thus, the adoption of term limits may actually
increase the effectiveness ofjunior members in discharging their con-
stituent-service functions.
Similarly, another time-consuming acivity-advertising' 56-can
be accomplished by junior members as effectively as it can by more
senior lawmakers. Advertising by a lawmaker occurs when she makes
speeches, issues press releases, introduces bills, or engages in floor
activity with the purpose of increasing her political brand name, but
not necessarily intending to affect substantive policy. The common
thread among all these activities is that the legislator is not working
toward enacting legislation; instead, she is concentrating on enhanc-
ing her visibility and name recognition. Just as with constituent ser-
vice, a junior legislator appears able to engage in advertising with as
amounts of constituent service than more senior members. Using data measuring the
number of trips home and the proportion of congressional staff located in district offices,
Hibbing found a slight negative correlation between tenure in office and attention to con-
stituent service. HIBBING, supra note 52, at 134-35.
155 See FIoRINA, suPra note 66, at 63-64.
156 Although I use the term "advertising" to include all such behavior, Professor May-
hew distinguishes advertising from "credit claiming" and "position taking." MAYHEW, supra
note 69, at 49-65 (describing advertising, credit claiming, and position taking). Advertis-
ing, according to Mayhew, is "any effort to disseminate one's name among constituents in
such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little or no issue
content." Id. at 49. Credit claiming creates the impression that the lawmaker is directly
responsible for some beneficial action taken by the federal government. It is related to
casework and project assistance in that not only does the legislator want to meet her con-
stituents' demands that she solve problems, but she also wants to ensure that her success
(or, at the least, her energetic efforts) are widely known. Id. at 52-61. Finally, position
taking is similar to advertising except that, with respect to the former, the lawmaker's pub-
lic statements contain some information about her stand on issues. Id. at 61-65.
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much enthusiasm and skill as a more senior lawmaker. -The appren-
ticeship norm that discouraged junior members from speaking in
committees, offering amendments, or participating in debate on the
floor no longer exerts much influence in either the House or the Sen-
ate.' 57 New members seek publicity both at home and nationally by
introducing bills, making speeches designed to attract media atten-
tion, disseminating press releases that describe constituent service,
and proposing flashy floor amendments that are unlikely to pass.
Although junior lawmakers have the ability to advertise success-
fully, it is difficult to discern whether they engage in as much advertis-
ing as more senior members because studies measuring this behavior
are limited. In his life-cycle research, Professor Hibbing has measured
what he terms "legislative activity," that is, the number of bills intro-
duced, amendments offered, and speeches made. 58 He has found
that more senior members are more active, but that, over time, the
rate of increase in this measure is lower than the rates of increase for
other important legislative behavior, such as efficiency and specializa-
tion. 159 Hibbing concludes that significant involvement in legislative
activity cannot be learned in a workshop but is a matter of experi-
ence.1 60 With respect to true advertising behavior, this conclusion
seems questionable. Advertising behavior that Hibbing does not
study, such as making public speeches and preparing press releases,
can be learned and practiced effectively early in the legislative career.
Indeed, as long as the legislator is concerned only with introducing
legislation, and not with whether it passes, she can easily draft bills
and floor amendments (with the help of her staff and the professional
legislative drafters who work in each house), and the party caucuses
will handle the logistics of bill introduction. 161 Experience is not a
prerequisite of effective advertising.
Some studies indicate that both constituent service and advertis-
ing may decrease in a world of term limits because legislators who
voluntarily retire significantly reduce both types of behavior at the
end of their tenure. 162 One explanation offered for these findings is
157 See Herbert B. Asher, The Changing Status of the Freshman Representative, in CONGRESS
IN CHANGE, supra note 16, at 216-17 (noting decline of apprenticeship norm in the House);
Norman J. Ornstein et al., The U.S. Senate in an Era of Change, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED,
supra note 36, at 19-20 (noting that the norm no longer operates in the Senate).
158 Hibbing, supra note 36, at 80.
159 See id. at 80-81; HIBBING, supra note 52, at 116-19.
160 Hibbing, supra note 36, at 82.
161 Cf Mark Anderson, Changes on the Way: Preliminay Effects of Term Limits in Arizona,
TERm LIMiTs OUTLOOK SERIES, Nov. 1995 at 14 (describing training program for new mem-
bers designed by state house leaders after operation of term limits resulted in substantial
number of freshmen).
162 Rebekah Herrick et al., Unfastening the Electoral Connection: The Behavior of U.S. Rep-
resentatives When Reelection is No Longer a Factor, 56J. OF POL. 214 (1994) (using cross-sec-
672 [Vol. 81:623
TERM LIMITATIONS
that lawmakers .engage.in ,this behavior primarily with an eye to reelec-
tion. 163 In addition, constituent service requires significant office-spe-
cific investment which politicians who serve in office for a short time
may be unwilling to make even if they have the ability to do so.'6 4
These conclusions are of limited relevance to our inquiry, however.
The question at issue is whether new members of Congress have the
ability to advertise or to offer constituent services if they perceive bene-
fits, such as the prestige of public recognition and respect. In addi-
tion, if progressive ambition becomes the norm after term limits,
politicians will continue to be interested in advertising that can en-
hance their name recognition when they run for future office; they
will also perform constituent service that can help them move along
the political opportunity structure. These ambitious politicians sub-
ject to term limits will not act like voluntary retirees under the current
system.' 65 That is, term limits will not sufficiently unfasten the electo-
ral connection to reduce appreciably advertising and constituent ser-
vice. The electoral connection will remain, but with an added link-
from the end of service in one job to the campaign for the next polit-
ical opportunity.
My focus in this section is neither on constituent service nor ad-
vertising; instead, I am concerned with a different behavior-legisla-
tor effectiveness. A legislator is effective when she moves her bills
successfully through Congress and proves that her policy agenda is
more than an idea in a press release. The ability to be an effective
lawmaker is of paramount importance for those who enter politics
with a desire to implement policy. Such people may find politics a less
attractive career after the passage of term limits for several reasons.
First, because term limits necessarily reduce the time in which a legis-
lator can attempt to influence policy through service in one job, and
because the cinch in the political opportunity structure reduces the
chances for a long political career, the policy-minded lawmaker may
tional and life-cycle analyses to conclude that voluntary retirees offer less legislation and
make fewer speeches at the end of their tenure than other legislators). With respect to
constituent service, Herrick's study shows a statistically significant decline in the number of
trips home and the number of staffers assigned to the district offices during a member's
last term. Id. at 221, 224.
163 See id.
164 For a discussion of the investment required for constituent service, see CAIN ET AL.,
supra note 110, at 57-76;J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANcS McCAL ROSENBLUTH,JAPAN'S PoLrr-
IcAL MArPLAcE 27-28 (1993) (making a similar point in the context of the Japanese
political system).
165 Indeed, Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing found that politicians who run for higher
office are more active than their colleagues. These progressively-ambitious politicians in-
troduce more bills than representatives who are merely seeking reelection. Herrick et al.,
supra note 162, at 224 n.8 (noting limited data set).
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worry that she will have insufficient time to accomplish her agenda.1 66
However, this concern may be ameliorated if she is confident that a
much weaker seniority system will allow her greater influence earlier
in her career.
More significantly, experience appears to be the critical factor in
developing the skills necessary for legislator effectiveness. Professor
Hibbing, in his life-cycle work, measured two relevant behaviors: "leg-
islative specialization" (determined by dividing the total number of
bills into the number of those bills that were referred to the most
frequently involved committee) and "legislative efficiency" (deter-
mined by adding the number of bills passed and the number of bills
reported out of committee).167 The difference between junior and
senior members with respect to specialization and efficiency is "nota-
ble." 68 And, this difference can be attributed solely to a lawmaker's
tenure in office. 69 When Hibbing compared his findings regarding
legislative activity (the mere number of bills and amendments intro-
duced) to his findings concerning legislative specialization and effi-
ciency, he found that the latter activities do not reach their means
until the sixth or seventh term of House service, while the former-
which is at least as closely related to advertising as to legislator effec-
tiveness-reaches its mean by approximately the second term. 70 In
other words, even moderately experienced legislators are not yet
skilled in the arts of specialization and efficiency.
One could argue that the increase in legislator effectiveness asso-
ciated with tenure results from something other than a senior mem-
ber's enhanced skills and knowledge. Perhaps legislator effectiveness
correlates with long tenure because incumbents have more seniority
and thus fill powerful leadership positions in Congress. With the
adoption of term limits, and the decline of the seniority system,junior
166 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 161, at 7 (Ariz. Rep. Mark Anderson writes, "Term
limits forces me to look at my situation very differently than I otherwise might... I have
only a short time to succeed, and that forces me to be more aggressive and not wait for my
turn to become a major player.").
167 HIBBING, supra note 52, at 112-13.
168 Hibbing, supra note 36, at 80.
169 HIBBING, supra note 52, at 163. Using a mathematical model in which elections are
treated as "filters" to select for quality candidates, Jeffrey Mondak concluded that term
limits will reduce the effectiveness of the electoral "filter" and that, therefore, elections will
screen out fewer low-quality candidates. Mondak, supra note 78, at 723-24. Some of
Mondak's assumption are questionable, however, including the threshold premise that vot-
ers are often offered a meaningful choice between a lower-quality incumbent and a more
capable challenger. See supra part III.C.1 (discussing absence of serious challenges to in-
cumbents). Mondak acknowledges that his conclusions would be undermined if the pres-
ence of term limits attracts higher-quality candidates to run for office. Mondak, supra at
718. See also Mark P. Petracca, A Comment on "Elections as Filters, "48 POL. Rrs. Q. 729 (1995)
(disputing Mondak's claims and criticizing his methodology); JeffreyJ. Mondak, Focusing
the Term Limits Debate 48 PoL Rus. Q. 741 (1995) (responding to Petracca).
170 HIBBING, supra note 52, at 121.
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members will hold influential posts and can therefore be more effec-
tive. Hibbing's findings, however, do not support this argument; he
discovered that the relationship between holding formal positions in
the House and legislative involvement, including activity, specializa-
tion, and efficiency, is extremely weak when the effect of tenure on
both was controlled. 171
Second, one might argue that senior members are more efficient
because they can spend less time on reelection activities. By exten-
sion, term-limited members, freed from concerns about reelection,
will focus on enacting law from the start of their careers. The study
demonstrating that retirees in their last term focus more on their pol-
icy agendas and less on mere position-taking supports this argu-
ment.' 72 As I have noted above, however, adoption of term limits
does not necessarily mean that members will remain in politics for
only a short time, so these results may not hold true for term-limited
politicians. Progressively-ambitious politicians will continue to spend
much time on activities designed to increase their political brand
names and to allow them to move to different offices when they reach
the limit on their current ones.
Even if term limits reduce the time lawmakers spend on advertis-
ing and constituent service, having more time to specialize will not
mean much to a legislator who lacks essential lawmaking skills. The
close association between substantial expertise and legislator effective-
ness is hardly surprising. After all, successfully negotiating the many
procedural hurdles of the legislative process requires a sophisticated
knowledge of the rules, the dynamics of the institution, the personali-
ties of key members of the House or Senate, and the preferences of
other relevant players such as the President. 7 Shortened tenure is
not the only factor at play here; any weakening of seniority may also
negatively affect the stability and strength of committees-the entities
through which legislator expertise is most often exercised. The sen-
iority system encourages a lawmaker to do low-level committee work
to assure further success in future committee leadership roles. The
erosion of seniority may mean that a junior legislator will receive a
plumb committee assignment, but she may lack the knowledge to use
171 Id. at 163. See also Hibbing, supra note 36, at 81 (noting that the years of decentrali-
zation of power in the House were also the years during which the relationship between
tenure and legislator effectiveness grew stronger); Richard L. Hall, Participation and Purpose
in CommitteeDecision Making 81 AM. PoL Sci. REv. 105, 120 (1987) (noting that, controlling
for formal position and other factors, junior members had not achieved "participatory
equality" in committee activities).
172 Herrick et aL., supra note 162, at 219, 221.
173 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEo.
LJ. 523 (1992); see also Schrag, supra note 80, at 27 (stating that "no one who has been
there four years or less has learned enough about California's complicated system of
government").
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that position for anything more than advertising purposes. If commit-
tee assignments and advancement are contingent on less certain
mechanisms than seniority, she will have less incentive to make the
time-consuming investment to acquire expertise. 174 A legislator may
become an expert in tax matters, for example, only to find that chang-
ing political fortunes have resulted in her reassignment to the postal-
service committee.
Committees will decline under term limits for another related
reason. Other members of Congress defer to committee recommen-
dations in part because committee leaders are repeat players who have
specialized knowledge in a particular area. A repeat player in the leg-
islative arena has incentives to deal honestly with her colleagues so
that her future credibility is not impaired. 175 She can discipline mem-
bers who oppose her by denying them provisions that they ask her to
include in future bills. 176 Again, increasing uncertainty about institu-
tional advancement will mean that members are less likely to serve as
repeat players. Consequently, they will not necessarily have greater
expertise; they will have reduced incentives to send only truthful sig-
nals to colleagues; and, without the sure ability to shape future legisla-
tion, they will likely lack the power to threaten defectors.
If reduced tenure negatively affects the development of the polit-
ical expertise necessary for legislator effectiveness, and if the work-
horses of the legislature-the committees-are weakened, the
number of major bills that spark determined opposition may drop
considerably, and the overall quality of legislation may decline. Such
a change in legislative output does not necessarily mean that repre-
174 See ShepsIe, supra note 119, at 250-51; Barry R Weingast & WilliamJ. Marshall, The
Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Mar-
kets, 96J. POE. ECON. 132, 143 (1988) (explaining the importance of the seniority system to
a stable committee structure). Of course, one would not expect to see the complete disap-
pearance of congressional committees. Given time constraints and the complexity of the
modem world, Congress has no choice but to operate in smaller units staffed by specialists.
Moreover, the committees will maintain a degree of power because of their members' role
in the conference committees that will continue to shape final legislation. See Kenneth A.
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 85 (1987) (discussing the significance of this "ex post veto power"). But see Keith
Krehbiel, Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful, 81 AM. PoL Sci. REV. 929 (1987) (con-
testing the Shepsle-Weingast conclusion and noting constraints on the "ex post veto
power" of committees); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Response to Krehbie4 81
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 935 (1987).
175 McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 3, 27 (1994).
176 See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 174, at 88-89 (describing examples of discipline
by committees); Weingast & Marshall, supra note 174, at 14041 (discussing the difficulty of
making credible promises or threats when implementation will not occur until subsequent
legislation is considered). See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECI-
SIONS 110-45 (1989) (discussing the role of committee chairmen and party leaders in influ-
encing the decisions of members of Congress).
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sentatives will pass fewer bills. Indeed, the number of bills passed by
any Congress is a statistic that imparts relatively little information. For
example, the legislature has done much of its recent work through
omnibus bills. So, while the total number of pages enacted has in-
creased, the number of bills passed has declined. Additionally, the
number of pages is not indicative of the significance of the legislative
activity. The number of pages will not drop, for example, if lawmakers
spend their time passing advertising legislation, declaring holidays
such as "Law Professor Appreciation Day," or establishing hundreds of
commemorative coins. What a decline in legislator effectiveness does
mean is a decline in the number of contested bills, such as telecom-
munications overhaul, welfare reform, or employment-discrimination
legislation-laws that do not receive overwhelming support.1 77
Lack of expertise affects both the ability to pass bills and the abil-
ity to block them, but it impairs the former to a much greater degree
than the latter.'78 Even relatively inexperienced lawmakers can learn
how to block the passage of legislation; they will need to be successful
at only one of the many vetogates along the path of enactment. 179
Thus, unless lawmakers make changes to compensate for the effects of
term limits, the complicated congressional structure with its many
hurdles will create more frustration for people who want to enact,
rather than to block, controversial policies.
Policy-minded politicians will try to overcome their reduced legis-
lative ability to be effective by altering one or more of the following
institutional features of Congress. First, legislators may reduce the
number of vetogates in the system and the complexity surrounding
them. Some vetogates are imposed by the Constitution, such as the
requirement that both legislative bodies agree, the requirement that
revenue bills originate in the House, and the requirement that a two-
thirds majority in both houses is necessary to override a presidential
veto. A number of legislative hurdles are creatures of statute, how-
ever, and can be changed more easily. For example, rules that allow a
filibuster to kill a bill in the Senate unless sixty members invoke clo-
ture can be changed if two-thirds of the senators who vote on the mat-
177 See Schrag, supra note 80, at 28 (noting the difficulty after adoption of term limits
in "hold[ing] votes together and enact[ing] any major legislation-indeed, do[ing] any-
thing that takes patient compromise and thus requires the luxury of time and a relatively
stable group of bargainers").
178 See JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMoscLERoss: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 124-25 (1994) (discussing asymmetry in legislative process, i.e., ease of blocking legis-
lation relative to passing laws); KAY SCHLOZMAN &JOHN TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317, 395-96 (1986) (noting that interest groups are more successful
at blocking, rather than passing, legislation because "there are so many opportunities for
throwing up roadblocks to unwanted action").
179 See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 178.
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ter agree.'8 0 Moreover, members of the two chambers can harmonize
legislative rules so that familiarity with Senate procedures will breed
familiarity with House procedures, and vice versa. This effort can in-
clude state legislatures as well. The greater the consistency in proce-
dures, the greater the ability to enact bills and-much to the dismay
of term limits supporters-the greater the likelihood that progressive
ambition will characterize most politicians. 18
Second, if the seniority system is replaced by a system where the
committee chairs are selected as a kind of "Cabinet" of the Speaker or
Majority Leader, all congressional leaders are likely to share a commit-
ment to the same policy agenda. This homogeneity of opinion will
reduce friction at many pressure points. An example of this type of
coordination was the allegiance of the committee chairs to Speaker
Gingrich during the first months of the 104th Congress which allowed
him to push through much of the legislation promised in the Con-
tract with America. 182 This solution to the problem of reduced legisla-
tor effectiveness will require a great deal of coordination and
similarity of policy objectives; one defector can derail a bill, and the
minority party may frequently be able to muster the strength to block
initiatives (especially in the Senate).
Finally, politicians can attempt to find alternative sources of ex-
pertise on which to rely. The professional congressional staff, particu-
larly those who work for committees or other expert entities such as
the Congressional Budget Office, are the most obvious replacement
for experienced legislators. Currently, staff turnover is much greater
than the turnover of members; for House staffers, the turnover is 3.4
times greater than for representatives, and Senate staffers turn over at
a rate that is 2.1 times greater than that of senators. 8 3 If these rates
are indicative of the turnover of knowledgeable staffers after term lim-
its, most aides will have no greater expertise or experience than term-
limited members. The aggregate turnover rates for all congressional
staff are not the most relevant statistics for this inquiry, however. Un-
fortunately, they are the only statistics available. More crucial is the
180 See Senate Rule XXII, para. 2. The rule itself can be changed by a simple majority
vote, but ending a filibuster of a rule change requires adoption of a cloture motion by two-
thirds of the senators voting.
181 Professor Berkman has found that experience in state legislatures helps U.S. repre-
sentatives display greater policy and institutional expertise and enables them to advance in
leadership roles more quickly than their inexperienced colleagues. Michael B. Berkman,
Former State Legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives: Institutional and Policy Mastery, 18
LEG. STUD. Q. 77 (1993). Interestingly, the development of such skills is more pronounced
in members who have served in professionalized state legislatures, id. at 91, 94, so state
term limits may affect this trend.
182 See Koszczuk, supra note 136, at 3049.
183 Norman Leahy, Term Limitation and the Re-Ordering of Congressional Culture 2 KAN. J.
OF LA~W & PUB. POL'Y 31, 36 & tbl. 1 (1993).
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length of the tenure of the professional committee staff, whose roles
tend to be less political and more substantive. One would expect that
the turnover for these staff members is less rapid because they must
stay longer to develop detailed knowledge in a particular area. 84
Moreover, it seems likely that staff tenure varies among committees; 85
in particular, future studies should focus on staff turnover for commit-
tees on which members can serve for only limited terms, such as the
House Budget Committees and the Select Committees on Intelli-
gence. Future studies should also measure the effects of the new con-
gressional rule limiting the terms of House committee chairmen to six
years. These figures will more closely approximate turnover rates
under term limits. Without this more sophisticated analysis, argu-
ments about staff turnover and term limits provide little illumination.
Even if we develop these more refined turnover statistics, they
may not accurately portray the length of staff tenure under term lim-
its. Term-limited members of Congress, hoping to compensate for
their relative lack of expertise through the use of professional staff,
will encourage key aides to stay longer on the Hill. Members can pay
their key aides somewhat more generously, but staff compensation
cannot be increased substantially over current levels because of
budget constraints' 8 6 and because aides cannot receive higher salaries
than members.' 87 Some staff members will be willing to lengthen
184 Turnover may be more rapid, however, if the opportunity cost of government ser-
vice for these professional aides is higher. With some specialized knowledge and legislative
expertise, they may be able to command large salaries as lobbyists when they leave the Hill.
Such private sector opportunities are greater for those with greater mastery of the process,
however, which requires a significant period of governmental service.
185 Cf. Beth M. Henschen & Edward I. Sidlow, The Recruitment and Career Patterns of
Congressional Committee Staffs: An Exploration, 39 W. PoL Q. 701, 707 (1986) (studying pro-
fessional staff and noting that profiles vary between policy/prestige committees and con-
stituent committees).
186 The Fiscal Year 1996 Appropriations bill for the Legislative Branch reduced overall
appropriations for Congress by $206 million. Jonathan D. Salant, Legislative Branch Bill
Clears, Will Not Go to Clinton Soon, 53 CONG. Q. 3353 (Nov. 11, 1995) (stating that total
congressional appropriations were $1.63 billion). Such a reduction meant a 12.5% cut in
the salaries of congressional support agencies and reductions in the size of personal staffs.
By the beginning of the 104th Congress, Senate committee staffs had been reduced by
15%. Eliza Newlin Carney, Ignoring the Real Problem, NAT'LJ., May 27, 1995, at 1308. The
Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 1997 is expected to decrease funding even further. Eliza-
beth A. Palmer, House Passes Spending Bill with LittleDebate, 54 CONG. Q. 1948 (July 13, 1996)
(cutting spending by $37.4 million from fiscal year 1996).
187 A member of Congress earns $133,600 annually; congressional leaders are paid
$148,400; and the Speaker of the House receives a salary of $171,500. See5 U.S.CA § 5332
Sched. 6 (WEsr. SuPP. 1996). Congressional salaries are indexed for inflation. Id. Political
realities make salary increases very difficult; the most recent pay hike was a salient and
unpopular issue for many voters. See Richard Morin, Huge Majority in Poll Opposes 50%
Raise for Top Officials, WASH. Posr, Jan. 17, 1989, at Al (80% of respondents opposed pay
increase for members of Congress). Only a very few congressional staff members have
salaries approaching those of their bosses.
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their tenure on the Hill because of their increased responsibility and
greater influence over policy outcomes. Others may stay because the
opportunity cost of remaining in government service will likely de-
cline. Powerful and well-connected staffers, particularly those who
work on committees, have opportunities to work as well-paid lobbyists
or in other politically-related private sector jobs. As discussed
above,' 88 term limits will increase the supply of people who can work
for special interest groups, trade associations, or political think tanks.
Such an influx of qualified applicants will probably decrease the com-
pensation for these private-sector jobs. Accordingly, the amount of
financial sacrifice demanded of congressional aides who forego pri-
vate-sector opportunities will be reduced, and they will be apt to re-
main in government service longer.
Other staff members will stay long enough to develop significant
expertise because they plan to run for Congress. Indeed, it seems
likely that the political opportunity structure will evolve so that people
who hope to be elected to the House or Senate will serve apprentice-
ships as congressional staff members. 8 9 In this way, they can learn
the legislative ropes and then campaign on their greater ability to ac-
complish policy objectives in the time allowed by term limits. Again,
this development will not satisfy those who envision term limits as a
way to populate the federal legislature with political amateurs. Staff-
members-turned-legislators will be political careerists in many of the
same ways that long-time incumbents are now.
Although increased reliance on professional staff is a probable
response to term limits, this reliance may not fully compensate for the
loss in legislator effectiveness. Perhaps most importantly, staff and
legislators are not exchangeable commodities. Staff members can re-
search, draft, and negotiate, but in the end, the passage of controver-
sial legislation depends on the skills of the representatives or senators
supporting the proposal.'90 In addition, legislators will be loathe to
depend entirely on staff members who are chosen, not necessarily be-
cause of their political allegiance, but because of their superior knowl-
edge and expertise. A progressively-ambitious politician will be wary
of giving carte blanche to professional staff members who may be pur-
suing their own policy agendas, agendas that may not correspond to
those of the politician or her constituents. A politician will allow her
professional staff leeway only to the extent that she can monitor them,
188 See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
189 This phenomenon occurs now, but not often. See KC. Swanson, Upwardly Mobile ex-
Hill Aides, NAT'L J., Feb. 3, 1996, at 269 (fourteen former aides planned to run for the
House in 1996).
190 See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that term limits would reduce not only the
amount of pork-barrel legislation, but it might also affect other legislation).
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perhaps by filling some staff positions with political aides who possess
greater authority but less institutional knowledge.' 9'
Reduced legislative output regarding contested issues and a de-
cline in the overall quality of bills passed will not only affect the value
of the office for policy-minded, ambitious politicians; it will also have
broad ramifications foi-judicial officers and concerned constituents.
For example, an inability to pass new legislation may freeze current
political arrangements and policies because it is too difficult to
change them. A new class of lawmakers who had hoped to effect
profound changes will be frustrated, and the electorate that expected
reform will be disappointed. The difficulty of repealing current insti-
tutional relationships does not mean that those structures cannot be
* altered in other ways. For example, if, after the adoption of term lim-
its, a majority of senators favor a less intrusive federal government,
they can ensure that nominees to the federal bench are characterized
by a similar ideology. Narrow interpretations of existing laws may in-
directly accomplish what cannot be achieved directly through legisla-
tive change. Legislators who support such interpretations will be
certain to block legislation that seeks to overturn the judicial out-
comes. Thus, lawmakers motivated by a desire to influence policy di-
rectly will have to be content to play only a supporting policymaking
role. Even this limited influence will depend on lawmakers' ability to
predict the judicial philosophy of nominees; a comparison of the juris-
prudence of Justice Blackmun or of Justice Souter and the expecta-
tions of some of their congressional supporters demonstrates that
politicians can err in these assessments.
191 See, e.g., SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 178, at 309 (noting evidence of "en-
trepreneurial instincts of congressional staff"). Other sources of expertise, such as profes-
sional lobbyists, present even greater agency problems because, in addition to personal
preferences, lobbyists may have client interests that do not always correspond to legislator
interests. Thus, although legislators may compensate for their own lack of specialized
knowledge through an increased use of lobbyists, they will do so only to the extent that
they can detect divergence between their interests and those of their agents. See Upshaw,
supra note 138, at 733 (term limits may make legislators more dependent on interest
groups for information). Other commentators have argued that the reduction in congres-
sional effectiveness will increase the relative power of the executive branch. In particular,
it will expand the power of federal bureaucrats. See, e.g., Linda L. Fowler, A Comment on
Competition and Careers, in LIMITING LEGIsLATrIVE TERms, supra note 5, at 185; Nelson Polsby,
Restoration Comedy, 102 YALE LJ. 1515, 1524-25 (1993) (reviewing GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORA-
TION: CONGRESS TERm LIMrrs, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELBERATIVE DmocRAGY (1992)). If
the objectives pursued by members of the executive branch involve passing legislation,
certain bureaucrats will become experts in the legislative process and will assist less exper-
ienced congressional leaders in successfully negotiating vetogates. See also infra text accom-
panying note 232 (suggesting other implications for executive-branch/legislative-branch
relations).
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Finally, ifjudges interpret statutes under the principles of textual-
ism,192 a reduction in the quality of legislation may result in interpre-
tations of statutory language that were not intended by its drafters.
Textualism places great demands on the pellucidity of statutory draft-
ing.193 The current legislative process often fails to live up to these
standards, and a decline in legislator effectiveness and skill will not
improve the situation. In other words, to the extent that textualists
hope to "stimulate legislators to perform their functions better, as by
drafting statutes more precisely,"' 94 term limitations may substantially
impair the ability of legislators to rise to such a challenge. Alterna-
tively, a reduction in legislator effectiveness may prompt judges to re-
ject textualism for more purposive approaches in an effort to make
sense of lower-quality legislative output. 95 In part, the strategy se-
lected by the judiciary will hinge on the identity of the judges, which
in turn will be affected by the preferences of senators involved in the
confirmation process.
C. Term Limitations and Interest Groups
Perhaps one of the most hotly contested issues in the term limits
debate is whether such provisions will weaken or strengthen the influ-
ence of special interest groups over members of Congress.1 96 Sup-
porters of term limits point to the fact that most lobbyists oppose the
reform as an indication that interest groups prefer the status quo.1 97
Opponents counter that inexperienced legislators often turn to lobby-
192 For discussions of textualism in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal, see
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDozo L.
REV. 1597 (1991).
193 WIALm N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 233 (1994).
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) (critically evalu-
ating textualism, in part because judges "know that legislatures, including the Congress of
the United States, often legislate in haste, without considering fully the potential applica-
tion of their words to novel settings"); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189-90
(1986).
196 Compare MARK PETRAccA, PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT 8, TEMv LIMITS WILL PUT AN END
TO PERMANENT GOVERNMENT Ym INCUMBENTS (Nov. 1990) and Wiu, supra note 7, at 32, with
Polsby, supra note 191, at 1519, and NELSON POLSBY, PUBLiC AFFAIRS REPORT 9, LIMITING
TERMS WON'T CURB SPECIAL INTERESTS, IMPROVE THE LEGISLATURE, OR ENHANCE DEMOCRACY
(Nov. 1990).
197 Lobbyists tend to oppose term limits even though their influence may increase if
legislators are relatively less expert. This opposition probably stems from the belief that,
although their power as a group will increase, the power that individual lobbyists gain from
their close relationships with particular Congress members will decline as current
lawmakers are forced to leave office. See WILL, supra note 7, at 57 ("As for lobbyists, they
are indeed career people. And they are passionate opponents of term limits because they
have valuable investments in long-term relationships of mutual aggrandizement with ca-
reer legislators.").
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ists for expertise, and that they lack the ability to think critically about
information sent to them by organized interest groups. 198 Legal and
economic scholarship has so far provided no clear answer as to which
position is correct. Professors Spitzer and Cohen rely on the insights
of game theory to conclude that term limitations will result in "legisla-
tors spend [ing] less time working for general constituent interests and
more time on personal and special interests." 199 Preliminary empiri-
cal work suggests, however, that campaign contributions decrease af-
ter term limits are imposed on state legislators, indicating that at least
one form of special interest benefit to legislators is reduced. 200
The effects of term limitations on interest group behavior 201 are
important for a variety of reasons. Americans who favor federal term
198 See, e.g., Erik H. Corwin, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policj Implications, 28
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 569 (1991); Polsby, supra note 191, at 1524.
199 Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 4, at 508. One problem with Cohen and Spitzer's
model is that they use the constituents' ability to deny reelection as the principal control
that voters exercise over elected officials. See id. at 498-500 (punishment for legislators in
the political game is defeat at the polls). The evidence strongly indicates that voters sort
candidates and elect those who share their ideology; thus, representatives are unlikely to
defect in the political game, even in the last period. See infra notes 202-03 and accompany-
ing text. Spitzer and Cohen may be arguing merely that legislators, in the absence of the
possibility of reelection, will spend less time legislating. This limited contention appears to
have empirical support. SeeJohn R. LottJr., Attendance Rates, Political Shirking and the Effect
of Post-Elective Office Employment, EcoN. INQUIRY, Jan. 1990, at 133. Their claim is arguably
not so narrow, however. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 4, at 501-04 (describing methods
of defection). See also supra text accompanying notes 46-51 (discussing Spitzer and Co-
hen's game theory analysis).
200 Daniel & Lott, supra note 62, at 10-11 (discussing findings of a significant decrease
in campaign expenditures as a result of term limits in California); Lott, Simple Explana-
tion, supra note 62, at 23-24. Lott's study included one anomalous finding with respect to
campaign contributions and gubernatorial elections. Although he found that term limits
do reduce campaign expenditures, sometimes quite dramatically, he also found that in-
creasing the term lengths resulted in a reduction of campaign expenditures. Id. at 18 &
thl. 5. Lott is unable to explain this puzzling result, which is inconsistent with the findings
of a 1977 study by Crain and Tollison. W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, Attenuated
Property Rights and the Market for Governors, 20J. L. & ECON. 205, 207-08 (1977). But see Lott,
Simple Explanation, supra note 62, at 13-14 (discussing limitations of the Crain-Tollison
study). See also Daniel & Lott, supra note 62, at 3 (explaining the implication in the Crain-
Tollison study that two two-year terms produce greater campaign contributions than one
four-year term).
201 One of the first definitions of an "interest group" was supplied byJames Madison:
By a faction [his word for an interest group], I understand a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of inter-
est, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggre-
gate interests of the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Because of
collective action problems, the interest groups with the greatest influence on governmen-
tal policies tend to be small groups with intense preferences. See generaly DANIEL A. FRBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL INTRODUCTION 17-21 (1991);
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF CoLLEcrvE ACTION (1965) (presenting a theory to
explain which groups are likely to organize successfully to seek governmental benefits).
Madison would not .have assigned a pejorative label to a cohesive group seeking outcomes
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limitations seem to expect that this reform will weaken the power of
special interests and eliminate unseemly close relationships between
elected officials and lobbyists. One strand of public dissatisfaction is a
feeling that professional politicians work only for private gain or for
organized special interests; therefore, they do not act as the ordinary
constituent would want. If this displeasure is directed at the legisla-
tor's voting record, however, the criticism is not persuasive. A legisla-
tor's voting behavior appears to be relatively consistent with her
constituents' interests.202 Although interest groups play prominent
consistent with the rights of others or the interests of the community; many modem inter-
est group theorists make the same normative move. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest
Group TheoyJustify More Intrusivejudicial Review7, 101 YALE LJ. 31, 48-59 (1991) (discussing
need for normative baselines to understand interest group theory and to evaluate public
criticisms of their disproportionate or undesirable influence). For the purposes of this
Article, I am using a less normatively charged definition: "[Alny group that, on the basis of
one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for
the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by
the shared attitudes." DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PRocEss 33 (1951); see also
RAUCH, supra note 178, at 12-13, 44-50 (discussing the exponential growth of interest
groups that represent more general interests). Rauch notes that he realized how ubiqui-
tous interest groups had become when he discovered the Washington lobbying office of
the Baha'i religion, a faith which teaches that believers should abstain from politics. Id. at
38-39.
202 See KINGDON, supra note 176, at 30; see also id. at 43 (constituency is even more
important with respect to salient issues); id. at 259 (describing legislative decisionmaking
in an environment of conflict and noting that constituents are the first group consulted).
Commentators continue to debate how often and when legislators vote inconsistently with
their principals' desires. Compare Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting,
27 J. L. & ECON. 181 (1984) (analyzing congressional voting patterns using a principal-
agent model and concluding that legislators tend to serve their constituents' interests) with
Ryan C. Amacher & WilliamJ. Boyes, Cycles in Senatorial Voting Behavior Implications for the
OptimalFrequency of Elections, 33 PUB. CHOICE 5 (1978) (positing that the longer the electo-
ral period for an elected official, the less likely the official is to vote in accordance with his
constituents' interests) andJoseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behav-
ior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J. L. ECON. 103,
106 (1990) (testing the hypothesis that "as the slack in the constituent-policymaker bond
increases, ideological shirking should increase"). The consensus view is that legislators do
not engage in substantial shirking in the salient votes evaluated by various rating organiza-
tions like the National Taxpayers Union and the Americans for Democratic Action. This
certainly holds true as long as politicians know that voters can remove them from office in
the next election, and apparently it still holds true even when the threat of electoral conse-
quences is removed. See Bruce Bender &John R. Lott, Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking: A
Critical Review of the Literature, 87 PUB. CHOICE 67 (1996); see also MoRs P. FIORINA, REPRE-
SENTATrvEs, ROLL CALLS, AND CONsrrruENcaEs (1974) (detailed study of the effect of con-
stituencies on roll-call voting by legislators). Studies finding that legislators tend to share
the ideology of their constituents, and therefore to act as faithful agents even without the
threat of defeat, have focused on roll call voting. In one case, Professor Lott also studied
the frequency of voting, finding that legislators tend to vote less often when they do not
plan to run for reelection, although the substance of the votes they do cast does not
change in their last term. Lott, supra note 199, at 138-39 & tbl. 2. No one studying legisla-
tive shirking has focused on other less visible legislative activities, such as interactions with
colleagues or regulatory agencies, where there is a risk that legislators may act contrary to
the interests of their constituents.
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roles in the political process, those that exert the greatest influence
on major legislative votes appear to have agendas that reflect the inter-
ests of the lawmaker's constituents. Contrary to popular belief, inter-
est group benefits seem not to be the equivalent of payments to "buy
votes."203 Instead, interest group contributions flow to members who
share the interest group's ideological perspective and who can there-
fore be expected to vote consistently with its interests even in the ab-
sence of benefits. Thus, the primary purpose of such campaign
contributions may be to elect sympathetic members in the first place
and then to keep them sympathetic.
Perhaps term limits supporters do not believe that interest group
benefits actually change many votes; instead, they may believe that
benefits allow such groups greater access to the powerful than the or-
dinary citizen has, and that such access may influence the legislative
agenda in more subtle ways than overt vote buying.20 4 A member of
Congress exercises influence in much broader spheres than the hand-
ful of her public votes indicates. She can participate in logrolling to
shape particular provisions of a large omnibus budget proposal; she
can exert pressure on regulatory outcomes; and she can arrange for
interest group representatives to meet with other members of the leg-
islative and executive branch offices. The voters suspect that, at the
margin, interest groups influence outcomes (at least with respect to
203 Stephen G. Bronars and John R. Lott, Jr., recently studied the voting patterns of
members of the House of Representatives from 1977 to 1990 to determine whether their
voting behavior changed as a result of PAC contributions. Stephen G. Bronors andJohn R.
Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How A Politician Votes?, (Aug. 9, 1994) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review). Their data, compiled from tests of
the behavior of retiring members in their final period, compared both to their previous
voting behavior and to the behavior of members who did not receive similar PAC contribu-
tions, reveal stable patterns of voting and do not support the argument that campaign
contributions are used to "buy" members' votes. This study is consistent with others that
have found either no influence on voting or ambiguous influences from PAC contribu-
tions. See, e.g., Janet M. Grenzke, Shopping in the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is
Complex, 33 AM.J. POL Scr. 1 (1989);John R. Wright, PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An
Organizational Perspective, 79 Am. POL Sci. REV. 400 (1985). But see JAMES B. KAU & PAUL H.
RUBIN, CONGRESSMEN, CONSTITUENTS, AND CONTMBUTORs 83-113 (1982). John Kingdon
has also found that federal lawmakers are only slightly influenced, if at all, by interest
groups that are not connected with the members' constituency in some way. See KINGDON,
supra note 176, at 146-74. See also SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 178 (noting different
tactics used by interest groups with respect to legislators who do not share their views).
204 See, e.g., Leahy, supra note 183, at 33-34 ("Clout is also a class issue. It implies that
someone (a congressman) has the power to deliver favors for those of special need (special
interests) at the expense of those who would otherwise benefit (the taxpayers of every
state).... This favored class of individuals has access that the ordinary constituent can
rarely attain."); Ron Nehring, Congressional Before Crossroads: The Citizen Congress Act Moves
Ahead, No UNCERTAIN TERMs, Dec. 1995, at 6 (discussing the perquisites showered on mem-
bers of Congress by interest groups).
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the details of legislation) ,205 and that they command a disproportion-
ate share of the lawmaker's time and attention. Even if sorting by
voters results in legislators with ideological preferences similar to
those of their constituents, interest groups may be able to shape the
congressional agenda to give priority to items that are relatively unim-
portant to voters. In addition, speeches by legislators at the behest of
interest groups may operate to determine what issues voters consider
to be salient.
For the purposes of this article, the change in interest group ac-
tivity is important because it may alter the nature of the legislative
office and therefore affect certain professional politicians' decisions
to run for Congress. If one of the reasons people currently choose a
career in politics is to receive interest group benefits, whether in the
form of campaign contributions, in-kind benefits while they hold of-
fice,206 or employment when they retire from public life,207 then a
reduction in the value of such benefits will reduce the desirability of
the office.
To understand the phenomenon of interest group benefits, it is
helpful to understand the relationship between groups and politi-
cians. In return for benefits from a group, lawmakers work to pass
desired legislation, to block proposals that would impose costs on the
group, and to provide interest groups access to officials in the legisla-
tive and executive branches. From an interest group's perspective,
the value of a deal with legislators depends on the deal's durability, a
205 Schlozman and Tierney argue that interest groups disproportionately influence the
details of legislation:
[The ability to influence details] is not in the least a trivial form of influ-
ence. On the contrary, one of the axioms of policy analysis is that to know
what a piece of legislation actually does, it is important to look beyond its
broad purposes to the particulars; it is the details that specify such critical
matters as when the measure is to take effect, whom it covers, how much is
to be spent, and who has what authority to implement it. How such particu-
lars are defined determines whether a measure will be a mere symbolic
gesture or a potentially effective policy.
SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 178, at 311.
206 In the 104th Congress, the House and Senate amended their rules to tighten the
restrictions on gifts from lobbyists. House members are prohibited from accepting gifts
from people other than family and friends. Senators can only accept gifts valued under
$50, and they can receive no more than $100 worth of gifts from any one source (other
than family and friends). These rules may operate to eliminate from the pool of potential
candidates those who place a high value on such in-kind benefits from special interests.
The restrictions are not airtight, however. Certain exceptions in the new rules will allow
legislators to travel extensively and to enjoy special treatment as long as the trips can be
tied to their official duties. See Peter H. Stone, Lobbyists on a Leash, NAT'LJ., Feb. 3, 1996,
at 242 (describing the various loopholes in the lobbying reform rules).
207 Federal regulation of post-tenure employment remains virtually non-existent; the
provision currently in force, 18 U.S.C. § 207, is seldom used, and when it is invoked, prose-
cutors seldom prevail, see, e.g., United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989).
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somewhat uncertain factor given the vagaries of the legislative pro-
cess.208 In other words, a tax expenditure worth $1 billion annually to
the independent oil and gas industry is more valuable if the politician
can promise not only that she will enact such legislation, but also that
she will stop any future attempts to repeal or narrow the provision.
The industry should be willing to transfer to politicians an amount up
to the present value of such a tax benefit, a figure that rises as the
durability of the legislative deal increases. 20 9
The nature of the legislative process renders the credibility of any
promise of durability problematic, even in the current system. A fu-
ture Congress, whose members do not share the interest group's
agenda, has the power to alter past legislative bargains. The member-
ship of Congress need not change to cause a breach of a legislative
deal; the legislator who promises a long-term benefit to one interest
group may be persuaded to renege on her deal, perhaps by a higher
payment from another group. Term limitations further impair the
durability of legislation and, thus, the value of any bargain. The de-
cline of the seniority system, the resulting volatility in committee ap-
pointments, and the reduced tenure for pivotal members of Congress
mean that an interest group cannot be certain that a sympathetic leg-
islator will be in a position to control an important vetogate or to
block attempts to unravel past legislative arrangements. Even if sen-
iority remains a vibrant norm, a twelve-year limit on service means that
a member will serve as a committee chairman for no more than four
to six years.210 No longer will the oil and gas lobby know, for example,
that for nearly two decades, a Russell Long at the helm of the Senate
Finance Committee can block tax legislation detrimental to their
objectives.
One aspect of the change wrought by term limits suggests that
durability may not be reduced as much as might be expected. If term
limits reduce legislator effectiveness so that lawmakers lack the skill to
repeal or modify old bargains, then past legislative deals will remain in
place. From the interest group's perspective, however, greater inepti-
208 See Richard L. Doemberg & Fred McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. Ray. 913 (1987); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction
and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); Weingast
& Marshall, supra note 174, at 138-39 (discussing ways Congress attempts to assure credibil-
ity notwithstanding great difficulties in binding future congresses). For a general descrip-
tion of the interest group theory of politics, see Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, in PREDICTING Poumcs: EssAs IN EMPIRICAL PUBLC CHOICE 15 (W. Mark Crain
& Robert D. Tollison eds., 1990).
209 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18J. L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975);Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode 86 COLUM. L
REv. 223, 227-229 (1986).
210 See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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tude and confusion caused by more frequent turnover will reduce the
predictability of the legislative process. Interest groups will find un-
predictable promises much less reliable than the potent guarantee of
durability now provided by an entrenched committee system coupled
with a strong seniority norm.
By changing the value of the "product" that legislators can offer,
the adoption of term limits will reduce the amount of benefits that
interest groups are willing to fund.21' Assuming that interest groups
prefer that the legislative product remain unchanged, and that the
groups will continue to shower benefits on entities able to guarantee
durable deals, the affected parties-legislators and interest groups-
will try to develop alternate ways to ensure that deals do not unravel.
One entity with both a longer time horizon and an ability to act as a
conduit between interest groups and legislators is the political
party.2 1 2 If political parties can bargain with interest groups and reach
deals, they will receive the benefits and then parcel them out to legis-
lators. Ambitious people attracted to the bonanza of interest group
goodies can continue to pursue that objective, albeit through an
intermediary.
A political party can assume this role only if it is able to control
legislative outcomes to the extent necessary to make credible promises
concerning congressional action. Parties do not currently exercise
such control over their members. Rather than sorting candidates by
ideology or attempting to dictate voting behavior, party organizations
211 If the legislative "product" becomes cheaper, it will also become more affordable to
interest groups. In this case, term limits may actually increase the level of interest group
activity as more organizations can enter the market. This outcome is quite likely if signifi-
cant numbers of new legislators are interested in making deals to respond to the desires of
their constituents-many of whom participate in interest groups. Although less effective
legislators may find passing legislation more difficult, see supra part ]V.B., some interest
group legislation will pass because it faces little opposition or is part of the logrolling nec-
essary to enact other bills. Thus, legislative output may increase, but not with respect to
the controversial matters I identified as the potential casualties of term limits. See supra
text accompanying notes 165-81. But see Elhauge, supra note 4, at 29 (arguing that reduc-
tion in expertise would reduce certain interest group legislation (pork-barrel bills), but not
considering the effect of reduced durability or decreased cost of the legislative product).
As I discuss, however, legislators and interest groups that want the value of the legislative
"product" to remain unchanged can rely on entities with longer time horizons for durable
promises. See infra text accompanying notes 212-20.
212 See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 174, at 158-59 (noting that "strong parties and
strong committees, as institutional underpinnings of legislative exchange, are substitutes").
Parties also serve a coordinating function in the legislature by "providing a forum where
legislators can arrange [vote] trades," i.e., facilitate logrolling. J. MARK RAMSEYER, PUBLIC
CHOICE (University of Chicago Law & Economics Working Paper No. 34, 2d Series 1995).
A political party currently has a longer time horizon than an individual candidate because
the party remains a player on the political scene much longer than does any individual
politician. A political party may thus have an incentive to influence legislator behavior; to
the extent that parties are currently rather unsuccessful at this task, we might wonder
whether they could increase their influence in response to term limits.
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use their resources primarily.to elect a large number of party mem-
bers.2 13 Majority-party status is crucial in a variety of ways; for exam-
ple, the leaders of the majority party largely control the legislative
agenda. Certainly, party leaders also work to influence members'
votes, but renegade members often avoid harsh punishment because
leaders are more concerned with maintaining a large caucus than they
are with winning a vote on any particular issue. If rogue members
support the party on certain key procedural votes, such as voting for
the "rule" in the House or voting for cloture in the Senate, they can
safely diverge from the party line on other votes that are more salient
for their constituents. Similarly, lawmakers currently have no real in-
centive to strengthen political parties and reduce their own indepen-
dence because the power of incumbency allows them to make
legislative deals that are durable enough without an additional party
guarantee. Given the discount rate applied to any deal, a legislator's
promise of twenty to thirty years protection is worth as much as a
promise of indefinite duration made by a political party.
Under term limits, however, political parties need not remain pa-
per tigers (or, more accurately, a paper donkey and elephant). First,
parties can sort potential candidates, as voters do now, supporting
only those who share their ideology.2 1 4 Potential candidates can bene-
fit from party support in several ways. Party affiliation is an important
signal to voters during campaigns; even with the rise of incumbency as
a voting cue, the most significant factor affecting a voter's decision
may be her partisan identification.2 15 As term limits reduce a candi-
213 See Kevin M. Leyden & Stephen A. Borelli, Party Contributions and Party Unity: Can
Loyalty be Bought?, 43 W. POL. Q. 343, 345 (1990) (noting that "[p]arty committee staffers
repeatedly state that their mission is to help congressional candidates win elections, not to
influence policy or policymakers"). Leyden and Borelli's study suggests that certain kinds
of campaign spending by parties can increase party unity among winning candidates and
thus can be used by parties to influence legislative outcomes. Id. at 358. See also Steven G.
Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1479, 1527 n.155
(1994) (noting that while parties attempt to send out signals concerning ideology, they
also need to assemble majorities).
214 See John R. Lott, Jr. & Michael L. Davis, A Critical Review and an Extension of the
Political Shirking Literature, 74 PUB. CHOICE 461, 478 (1992) (noting that evidence suggests
that sorting by voters is efficient and occurs quickly).
215 See, e.g., CAIN ET AL., supra note 110, at 9 (noting continuing importance of partisan
affiliation even with the rise of the "personal vote," or support for a candidate based on her
personal qualities); cf. FENNO, supra note 67, at 241 (acknowledging importance of party
identification, but also noting increase in importance of home style and other "candidate-
centered" qualities); see also FioRINA, supra note 66, at 24-26 (discussing growing impor-
tance of incumbency cue in relation to party affiliation). But see PAUL S. HERRNSON, CON-
GRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON 205-06 (1995)
(concluding that incumbency is the "most important determinant of congressional elec-
tion outcomes");John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections, 71
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 166 (1977) (studying increasing importance of incumbency relative to
candidate's party affiliation, even for voters who identify themselves as either Democrats or
Republicans).
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date's ability to develop a distinct brand name, and as they diminish
the relevance of incumbency, a candidate may increasingly depend on
her party affiliation to win elections. Moreover, campaign contribu-
tions to candidates by political parties can be significant because the
"soft money" loophole in the campaign finance laws allows parties to
circumvent contribution limitations.2 16 Also a party contribution
spurs interest groups to direct their money toward those candi-
dates;21 7 thus, a party's contribution can influence a campaign to an
even greater extent than its monetary value suggests.
Other tools are also available to control a legislator's behavior
once in Congress. A party can begin to manipulate these tools if inter-
est groups will otherwise reduce their payments because of concern
that the party's sorting of candidates is not foolproof. Mechanisms for
disciplining a sitting member of Congress do exist even though they
are not now used to encourage particular voting behavior. For exam-
ple, party leaders can use committee assignments to reward and pun-
ish members for their voting behavior.218 It will become easier, and
216 The term "soft money" refers to contributions by parties at the state level ostensibly
for "get-out-the-vote" campaigns and other party-building activities. Anne H. Bedlington,
Loopholes and Abuses, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY. REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (Margaret L. Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990) [hereinafter
MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY]. Soft money expenditures are not limited by the fed-
eral campaign finance laws, and such expenditures by parties have been publicly disclosed
only since 1991. Peter H. Stone, Soft Money-Lots oft IsStill Secret, NAT'LJ., Nov. 25, 1995,
at 2913; Peter H. Stone, Labyrinth of Loopholes, NAT'LJ., Nov. 25, 1995, at 2912. Some soft
money still escapes disclosure. Most notable are expenditures by the so-called "leadership
PACs" which are controlled by congressional leaders who often contribute soft money to
the campaigns of members of Congress who have supported them and who face difficult
elections. Federal Elections Comm'n v. GOPAC, 917 F. Supp. 851 (D. D.C. 1996); see also
Eliza Newlin Carney, Backdoor PACs, NAT'LJ., Mar. 2, 1996, at 468 (noting increasing im-
portance of state-based PACs, which are not regulated by federal law and which are used by
many federal candidates). In fact, soft money is often coordinated with candidates' cam-
paigns, even those for federal office, and allows candidates to use their limited campaign
funds elsewhere. SeeJames A. Barnes, Diary's Gramm Entiy a Dud?, NAT'LJ., Sept. 23, 1995,
at 2365 (discussing common occurrence of coordination between particular candidates
and parties and party committees spending soft money). Soft money can add up to tre-
mendous sums; in 1995, the Republican and Democratic Party Committees collected more
than $64 million in soft money. Peter H. Stone, Some Hard Facts About Soft Money, NAT'LJ.,
Mar. 23, 1996, at 672; see also Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (allowing political parties to make unlimited in-
dependent expenditures during campaigns).
217 GARYJACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 96 (1980). Political parties
can also provide candidates with a great deal of technical support. See generally PAUL S.
HERRNSON, PARTY CAMPAIGNING IN THE 1980S (1988) (discussing the increasing importance
of political parties in congressional campaigns and detailing the technical and non-mone-
tary support they offer).
218 In recent Congresses, the party caucuses have tried to accommodate members' re-
quests for committee assignments and have not used their power of assignment to enforce
party discipline. See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GArTJIGSAW PuzzLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMrr-
TEE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE 236-38 (1978) (noting that statistical evidence
tends to support accommodation theory of committee assignments); SMITH & DEERING,
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more appropriate, to use measures of party support to choose con-
gressional leaders if the seniority norm is replaced by an ambiguous
merit standard. Given the relatively frequent turnover of party lead-
ers, the duty of monitoring members may fall to staff in either the
congressional party structures or the national party organizations.
Voting and other important indications of party loyalty, such as activi-
ties in committee, will be sufficiently public that knowledgeable ob-
servers can compile the relevant information and make it available to
party leaders when they organize each new Congress.
Finally, an institutional arrangement that allows political parties
to serve as intermediaries between interest groups and members can
be structured so that compliant party members still receive a signifi-
cant amount of interest group benefits. If the new arrangements elim-
inate the erosion of legislative durability, interest groups will be
willing to send political parties the same amount of benefits as they
now send to individual legislators-in whatever form would be most
helpful to lawmakers.219 For example, a party can reward its faithful
with campaign help or with employment in an enlarged party organi-
zation. Interest groups themselves can hire sympathetic lawmakers
who have been forced out of public life by term limits but wish to
continue their political involvement. 220
That benefits will often take the form of post-tenure employment
may mean that, under term limits, many of the current legislator
objectives identified previously can still be achieved by politicians.
Term limits will decrease a politician's ability to plan on a long-term
career in elected office, but, if she can be relatively certain of employ-
ment in ajob that allows her to use legislative skills and that offers her
benefits similar to those available to members of Congress, she can
face the increased uncertainty of the electoral process with greater
supra note 124, at 68-69 ("Although there are opportunities to do so, current party leaders
do not attempt to exercise special influence on the vast majority of assignment deci-
sions."). But see RICHARD F. FENNO,JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMrrEEs 25-26 (1973) (finding
that with regard to the important assignments to the Ways and Means Committee, party
leaders did impose a test of party orthodoxy); Jackie Koszczuk, GOP Faces Campaign Year
Adrift in Roiled Waters, 54 CONG. Q. 139, 141 (Jan. 20, 1996) (reporting that Gingrich ap-
plied discipline to freshmen who refused to vote with him to reopen the federal
government).
219 Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 4, at 515-17.
220 Professor Lott has found that politicians who leave public life forjobs with constitu-
ency groups or political parties do not behave differently in their last period than do other
politicians, indicating that the promise of future employment does not affect voting pat-
terns. John K. Lott, Jr., Political Cheating, 52 PUB. CHOICE 169, 176-179 (1987). This result
is consistent with his findings that voters ensure legislator fidelity through sorting, rather
than through the threat of denying reelection. However, his finding does not indicate
that, in a world with term limits, politicians who seek interest group rewards will not rear-
range institutional structures so that they can continue to enjoy the same amount of bene-
fits; for example, they can receive pecuniary benefit through salaries in post-tenure jobs
rather than through campaign contributions.
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equanimity. If she is entering politics to shape policies, she can con-
tinue to pursue that goal as a party official brokering legislative deals
and sorting candidates according to their ideologies. Indeed, with the
decline of legislative effectiveness, inexperienced lawmakers may rely
heavily on the "old hands" in the party. A candidate who primarily
desires prestige from public service, however, may be less pleased with
the effect of term limits on institutional arrangements. An increased
supply of people seeking lobbying jobs and party positions will de-
crease the prestige associated with these positions, as well as the pecu-
niary compensation they offer.
Thus, after term limits, political parties will have the capacity to
take advantage of politicians' reduced ability to extract payments from
interest groups in return for promises of long-term legislative deals.
The primary problem for the two parties as they attempt to fill this
new role will be that they do not have clearly defined ideological plat-
forms on which interest groups can rely. In their quest to gain the
support of a majority of voters in all parts of the country, parties avoid
firm allegiances to any ideology and attempt to represent all things to
all groups. 221 For example, the independent oil and gas lobby can
currently ascertain which candidates are likely to be sympathetic to its
perspective by looking at the region they represent, their past experi-
ence, and their particular statements on the economy and the indus-
try. The Republican and Democratic parties, however, do not send
out very clear signals about their positions on issues relevant to the
lobby. For example, the Democratic party has included strong sup-
porters of special legislation favoring the oil and gas industry, such as
Lloyd Bentsen and Bill Archer, as well as some of its most vocal oppo-
nents, such as Bill Bradley and Howard Metzenbaum. When the in-
dustry wants to negotiate with the Democratic party for a durable tax
expenditure, how can it know that the party will support candidates
similar to the first group of lawmakers, rather than the second? Un-
less the parties place greater importance on clear and binding policy
platforms, interest groups may be uncomfortable relying on them to
sort candidates.
But modern political parties are shaped by the institutional
framework in which they exist. In the absence of term limits, the most
221 Professor Rossiter once observed that our parties stand for "flag, home, mother,
virtue, liberty, and progress-in a word, for victory." CLINTON RossrrER, PARTIES AND POLI-
TICS IN AMERICA 175 (1960). See also Calabresi, supra note 213, at 1521 (detailing reasons
for reduced influence of political parties in modem Congress); Jonathan R. Macey, Pack-
aged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1443, 1463
(1994) (stating that party affiliation provides little information about the positions of par-
ticular politicians on issues) ;Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of Democratic and Republican Parties
as Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1990) (stating that the
ideological signal sent by party affiliation is quite weak).
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important objective for a party is to dominate the legislative and exec-
utive branches. Sending unambiguous signals concerning policy
objectives is less important. However, if a political party wants to as-
sume a new role under term limits, it can do so. For example, parties
can use geography and constituent interests as reliable proxies for ide-
ology. In the example above, oil and gas industry lobbyists may be
content if they know that Democrats from oil-producing states will fill
key spots on the energy and tax-writing committees and that the par-
ties will keep committee jurisdictions relatively unchanged from year
to year. Interest groups can therefore rely, not only on the promises
of the party, but also on the natural allegiance of members who are
likely to hold sympathetic views.
If the existing parties cannot change sufficiently enough to bro-
ker durable deals, other entities will develop to fill such a role. Per-
haps new political parties will form around defined platforms that
signal interest groups searching for a guarantor of durable political
deals, or perhaps parties will develop geographical units in the various
regions of the country. The history of political parties in this country,
however, is mainly one of a very few parties, so other devices for mean-
ingful signaling may be required. The role of intermediary may be
assumed not by political parties, but by well-established advocacy
groups such as the National Taxpayers Union, the Sierra Club, and
the Concord Coalition.222 Their endorsement of candidates can sig-
nal ideological preferences to interested parties, particularly to their
members who are likely both to vote and to contribute time and
money to sympathetic candidates. Such groups can act as conduits of
benefits to legislators, in part through the use of independent ex-
penditures, a virtually unlimited source of campaign funds.223 More-
over, such organizations can offer post-tenure employment to
222 Interest groups are already beginning to play this role. See Thomas B. Edsall, It
Doesn't Always Take a Party, WASH. POST, National Weekly Edition, Aug. 26 -Sept. 1, 1996, at
11 (discussing increasing political influence of outside groups such as the Sierra Club,
NARAL and the Chamber of Commerce since the 1980s); Michael Weisskopf, For the NFB,
Organizing Makes It So, id. at 12 (detailing activity of National Federation of Independent
Business in recent elections and importance of their endorsement in campaigns).
223 Independent expenditures are not limited by the federal campaign finance laws.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54-59 (1976) (per curiam); see also CandiceJ. Nelson, Loose
Cannons: Independent Expenditures, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 216
(discussing increasing importance of independent expenditures because they, unlike cam-
paign contributions, are unlimited). Independent expenditures have played substantial
roles in recent congressional elections. In 1992, independent expenditures were greater
than $10 million, with the National Rifle Association alone spending over $3 million. MOR-
Ris & GAmAcHE, supra note 86, at 79. In the 1994 elections, the various advocacy groups
favoring term limits used such expenditures to affect election outcomes. See DAN BALZ &
RONALD BROWNSTEIN, SToImNG THE GATES: PROTEST POLITICS AND THE REPUBLICAN REVI-
vAt. 23 (1996) (noting crucial role played by U.S. Term Limits organization in Oklahoma
congressional election); Look for Independent and Negative Ads in 1996 (National Public Ra-
dio Morning Edition, Nov. 11, 1995) (Transcript No. 1475-2, on file with author) (noting
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legislators; if the groups become more important players on the polit-
ical scene, these jobs may become very attractive to professional politi-
cians with compatible ideologies.
Prospective candidates who are motivated by a desire for interest
group benefits may thus be able to pursue that objective after the
adoption of federal term limits. Legislators will have an incentive to
use existing entities with longer time horizons-most obviously polit-
ical parties-to bargain with interest groups pursuing legislative deals.
In turn, these entities can serve as conduits of benefits to politicians,
encouraging persons with the proper ideological preferences to enter
political life. Again, the effect of term limits on the nature of the leg-
islative office may be negligible.
CONCLUSION
The primary claim of term limits activists, that adoption of an
amendment limiting the service of federal legislators will transform
Congress into a body of amateur, rather than professional, politicians,
is overstated. Not only will people still consider politics a promising
career option, but many who entered with discrete ambition will find
the temptation to remain in politics overwhelming. Perhaps persons
with sincere and settled discrete ambition will be found more fre-
quently in the federal legislature than now, but my analysis indicates
that they will be relatively rare creatures.
Although Congress will still be dominated by professional politi-
cians, the patterns of their careers may be different. Politicians may
exhibit cyclical ambition more frequently, working in state positions
or in politically-related private employment before reentering the fed-
eral government. Further analysis of the differences between career-
ists who serve for years in one office and careerists who hold a variety
of jobs at different levels of government would be useful. For exam-
ple, will a varied political experience change the relationship between
the federal government and the states, perhaps leading to increased
cooperation and coordination?
Future analyses of the effects of term limits ought not to focus on
the citizen-versus-professional debate,224 but rather on whether the
nature of the legislative office will be so profoundly changed by term
limits that even professional politicians will act differently. Given the
that Americans for Limited Terms spent $300,000 for issue ads that affected the congres-
sional race in which Speaker Foley was defeated).
224 If term limits activists remain committed to the notion of a citizen-legislature, then
they should consider alternative formulations of a term limitations amendment; for exam-
ple, implementing a lifetime cap on the number of years one person could serve in Con-
gress or in any elected office at the state or federal level. Such a restriction, however, will
exacerbate any decline in legislator effectiveness that results from the form of term limits I
study here.
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players' control over the rules of the game, however, term limits may
not result in the sort of sweeping structural changes envisioned by its
supporters. Many features of Congress and of the political arena are
endogenous; thus, self-interested legislators can alter these structures
to enable them to continue to meet many of their objectives.
Although federal legislators can compensate for many of the in-
stitutional effects wrought by term limits, it seems likely that term lim-
its will decrease lawmakers' ability to enact controversial legislation. A
less effective Congress will change the nature of what it means to be a
representative or a senator not only for those seeking to implement
new policies. In addition, less prestige will be associated with an office
that affects fewer Americans, disappointing those who seek power for
its own sake, and fewer interest group benefits will flow to politicians
who lack the skills to deliver suitable legislation.
My conclusion that legislative output, at least with regard to con-
tested issues, will decline suggests other directions for future studies of
term limits. For example, if term limits reduce the economic and so-
cial influence of the federal government, perhaps politicians whose
ideologies are more compatible with the new federal role will find
political careers particularly attractive. A discussion of possible
change in the ideological profile of Congress should focus not only on
whether Republicans will benefit more than Democrats, 225 but also on
whether persons favoring smaller government will be more prevalent
and more powerful. One hypothesis is that these "libertarians" do not
stay in Congress for long, often leaving in disgust or frustration. The
decline in the seniority system combined with shorter terms may in-
crease their willingness to serve. At the least, these conditions may
increase the influence of those libertarians who are elected.2 26 Such a
change in the dominant ideology of Congress would have far-reaching
225 Cf. John B. Gilmour & Paul Rothstein, Early Republican Retirement: A Cause of Demo-
cratic Dominance in the House of Representatives, 18 LEG. STUD. Q. 345 (1993) (noting that
Republicans voluntarily leave office at a higher rate than Democrats); Reed & Schansberg,
The House, supra note 5, at 712-13 (concluding that term limits would benefit Republicans
more than Democrats). But see Gary C.Jacobson, The House Under Term Limits: A Comment,
76 Soc. Sci. Q. 720 (1995) (questioning earlier findings because term limits alter career
incentives so fundamentally). Some supporters of term limits are quick to disclaim any
intention to favor one party over the other. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 17, at 740.
226 Weakening the seniority system may have other effects on the demographics of
Congress. For example, perhaps one reason large numbers of women are not found in the
Congress is that their family responsibilities lead them to careers which allow them blocks
of time away from work. If the seniority system is weakened, such prospective candidates
who want the option of rotating between public and private life will find legislative office
more attractive. A system that encourages candidates for Speaker or Majority Leader to
identify a "Cabinet" of committee leaders could increase the representation of women and
minorities in leadership positions. It is unimaginable, for example, that a President of
either party would appoint a Cabinet consisting only of white males.
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effects,2 27 including a substantial influence on the ideology of federal
judges whose views of constitutional issues and statutory interpretation
in turn affect the substance of federal law.
Alternatively, some supporters equate careerism with unaccept-
able fiscal policies and hail term limits as the cure. "The unhealthy
tendency that today requires constitutional correction is the distortion
of government and the, demotion of Congress in the regime. That
distortion and that demotion have been produced by legislative ca-
reerism predicated on constant abuse of the power of the purse."228 If
activists are arguing that long-time politicians are more likely to be-
come part of a "culture of spending" the longer they remain in office,
empirical data seem to undermine that claim. 229 It is unclear, how-
ever, whether the current system encourages those who favor large
wealth transfers through federal spending to seek a career in Con-
gress in the first place, or whether members who favor high spending
levels remain in Congress for a longer period. In other words, per-
haps the "culture of spending" is a manifestation not of a moral haz-
ard problem but of a selection bias.230 If the structure of the federal
government changed so that less wealth can be transferred by Con-
gress, those attracted to the federal legislature may be very different
sorts of people, even if they tend to remain in politics for the entirety
of their careers.
Perhaps term limits activists, many of whom are generally hostile
to the federal government, favor the amendment because it may re-
duce the ability of members of Congress to interfere in their lives. But
reduced legislator effectiveness may result in no reduction in the size
of the federal government, at least not in gigantic entitlement pro-
grams or in the benefits currently transferred through the tax code,
because these programs are on "automatic pilot." Unlike programs
227 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, A Swerve to the Right in California, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1996, at A6 (stating that term limits are partly responsible for a strong Republican pres-
ence in state legislatures and thus can generate significant policy change).
228 WILL, supra note 7, at 182; see also Stevens Backs Billion Dollar "Pork Boat" and Gingrich
Pulls Down Big Money forDistrict No UNCERTAIN TERs, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 6 (attacking pork
barrel politics and blaming unnecessary spending on lack of term limits); Putting an End to
the Prisoners'Dilemma of Incumbency, id. at 7 (same).
229 Arsene Aka et al., Is There a "Culture of Spending" in Congress? (August 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review). Cf C ARE, supra note 5, at
104-05 (finding that particularism, or pork barrel politics, thrives in the term-limited legis-
lature of Costa Rica). But seeJAmEs PAYNE, THE CULTURE OF SPENDING 175-81 (1991) (argu-
ing on the basis of cross-sectional data that increasing tenure correlates with increasing
willingness to support large spending programs); Robert A. Lawson & Russell S. Sobel, Will
Term Limits Limit Government Spending?, (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Cornell Law Review) (using cross-sectional data from 103d Congress and finding that
term limits might reduce government spending but that the effect would be small).
230 See W. Robert Reed et al., The Relationship Between Congressional Spending and
Tenure with an Application to Term Limits 15 (September 1995) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
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funded through the annual appropriations process, legislative change
is required to pare back entitlement programs, which constitute
nearly half of the federal budget 231 and, along with tax provisions, are
the most visible ways in which ordinary citizens are affected by the
federal legislature. If proponents of the "era of small government" do
not dismantle these programs before legislator effectiveness is im-
paired, program supporters can block reform legislation at any one of
the vetogates that survive after the adoption of term limits. 23 2
Finally, reduced legislator effectiveness may further empower the
President and the executive branch relative to Congress. Most obvi-
ously, long-time federal bureaucrats represent a source of expertise
that can compensate for reduced legislator effectiveness. Because ex-
ecutive officers will presumably offer their skills and institutional
knowledge only with respect to legislation they support, the executive
branch will significantly influence the congressional agenda. Indeed,
after term limits, the modern phenomenon of an "outsider" President
being out-maneuvered by the old hands on the Hill may become a
historical footnote. More interestingly, legislators may compensate
for the reduced ability to pass controversial bills by drafting more gen-
eral provisions that can gamer widespread support and can allow
lawmakers to avoid taking firm positions on contested issues. Such
general language will delegate more policymaking to administrative
agencies and federal bureaucrats, again increasing their relative
power.
Put more simply, when we move away from arguments about the
citizen-legislator and toward analyses of the dynamic interactions be-
tween term limits and institutional arrangements, we move into fasci-
nating territory full of challenging questions. The answers will
illuminate not only the effects of term limits; they may also improve
our understanding of current legislature behavior.
231 BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON ENTITLEMENT AND TAX REFORM, INTERIM REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 10-11 (1994).
232 Cf RAUCH, supra note 178, at 125 (discussing the difficulties of dismantling subsidy
programs in an interest group democracy). The difficulties that the Republicans in the
104th Congress have faced in enacting a budget reconciliation bill to restrain the growth of
certain entitlement programs should provide sobering evidence to fans of small govern-
ment; it is much easier to oppose change than to enact it.
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